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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEYOND GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER

THOMAS P. CROCKER*
ABSTRACT
In Grutter v. Bollinger the Supreme Court held that diversity was
a compelling interest for equal protection purposes that justifies
limited consideration of race through affirmative action programs.
But there was a catch. The Court predicted that diversity would cease
to be a compelling interest within twenty-five years. This Article
examines the surprising doctrinal and conceptual implications that
would follow if, having both the motive and means, the Court were
to overturn Grutter before its predicted 2028 sunset. Exploring
internal tensions within existing doctrine, this Article argues that
even if the Court were to overturn Grutter, a form of race-conscious
decision-making should remain constitutionally permissible. The
Court’s equal dignity jurisprudence in the line of cases running from
Lawrence v. Texas to Obergefell v. Hodges, rooted similarly in the
Court’s existing affirmative action jurisprudence, provides a basis for
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reconsidering the goal of affirmative action under an alternative
combined due process and equality framework. Under this jurisprudence, in order to respect the equal dignity of individual persons,
state actors must not dominate or deny central aspects of an individual’s personal identity. The law must grant the equality of individual
persons’ liberty to define and present their personal identities free
from government actions that would enshrine forms of disrespect as
a matter of law. But because race can be a constitutive feature of a
person’s identity, mandating colorblindness may deny a person’s
equal dignity to be considered holistically for who they are.
A cornerstone of the Court’s anti-affirmative-action reasoning,
through both dissents and majorities, is a principle of colorblindness
rooted in a conception of procedural individualism. The Constitution,
we are told, protects individuals, not groups. But as this Article
demonstrates, taking individual persons seriously—as the Court
urges—has the unexpected implication that government institutions
cannot be foreclosed from taking a person’s racial identity seriously
as well. The Court’s interpretive and ideological commitment to
individual persons as the bearers of constitutional rights entails a
textually based, constitutional commitment to persons who can be
seen holistically in ways that do not deny their racial identity. Thus,
as this Article argues, equal dignity introduces a complication for
colorblindness and creates an alternative constitutional framework
applicable even if the Court were to abandon the central holding of
Grutter. Equal dignity would allow government actors to consider
race when giving applicants affirmative consideration of their
personal identities in light of their social structures and histories. As
this Article introduces it, “affirmative consideration” is a process of
considering the personal identities of applicants holistically in their
best light, including their personal histories and constitutive features, which necessarily might include their race. To the extent that
society continues to make race relevant to the lives of persons through
explicit and implicit institutional practices, then to fail to consider
an individual as a person for whom race has mattered under
colorblindness would be to deny a relevant aspect of what makes
them a unique person, and thus, would deny them the equal dignity
that due process of law and equality protect. This Article explains
and defends this alternative constitutional basis for reorienting
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antidiscrimination law according to equal dignity principles that
makes possible the continuation of a modified form of race-conscious
university admissions programs, even if the Court were to sunset
Grutter’s diversity rationale. Reorienting constitutional doctrine
under equal dignity would foreclose a strict commitment to colorblind constitutionalism, permit affirmative consideration of complete
persons, and make possible a new understanding of race consciousness in official decision-making.

4

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:001

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
I. FROM INDIVIDUAL TO PERSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A. Equal Protection and Individualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B. The Constitution and the Person. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
C. Why Focusing on “Persons” Rather Than “Individuals”
Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
D. How Emphasizing the Constitution’s Textual Reference to
“Person” Provides a Better Interpretive Approach . . . . . . . 26
II. THE LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE . . . . . . 29
A. Affirmative Action Through the Lens of Strict
Scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
B. The Logic of Colorblindness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
C. Affirmative Action Jurisprudence and the Priority of
Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
III. AFFIRMATIVE CONSIDERATION UNDER DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A. Equal Dignity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B. Equal Dignity, Dimensions of Freedom, and Affirmative
Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
C. How Does Affirmative Consideration Change Affirmative
Action?—Supply-Side and Demand-Side Reasoning . . . . 69
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

2022]

THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEYOND GRUTTER

5

INTRODUCTION
In its 2003 opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court
concluded that the need to maintain diversity in higher education
was a compelling state interest that justified consideration of race
as one criterion among others in making admission decisions.1
Grutter established an equality standard good for a projected
twenty-five-year period. The Court warned that “[w]e expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary.”2 What happens to the constitutional status of affirmative action by 2028 is thus in question, but one expectation implicit
in the Court’s reasoning is that American society will have sufficiently remedied past problems of racial fairness to render its
continued use unnecessary.3 As a result, government institutions
that provide public goods such as educational opportunity would
have no compelling need to continue using race in their decisionmaking practices. If there were no compelling need, then affirmative
action would no longer be consistent with constitutional principles
of equality. The problem, the Grutter majority reasoned, was that
the practice of making individualized decisions that use race as an
admissions criterion deviates from the overriding constitutional
requirement of colorblindness.4 Equality, the Court has reasoned, is
best achieved through color-blind practices.5 As Justice Thomas
explained, “[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race
... because every time the government places citizens on racial
registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or
benefits, it demeans us all.”6 According to the Court in Grutter,
1. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
2. Id.
3. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved), 551
U.S. 701, 787 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The
enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”).
4. For an overview of the competing views, see Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to
Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J.
1278, 1294 (2011).
5. In Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Harlan first articulated the view that “[o]ur Constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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when the pressing need to include race as a consideration in
university admissions fades because of society’s success in achieving
greater racial justice, diversity will likely no longer serve as an end
to justify continued programmatic race-consciousness.7
Not only are Americans now in the last decade of Grutter’s
proposed temporal limit, but the Court will hear two challenges to
affirmative action in its October 2022 Term—a few years prior to
the predicted sunset.8 Spanning both private and public institutions
with challenges to Harvard University and the University of North
Carolina, these cases provide the Court with an opportunity to
conduct a comprehensive review of affirmative action programs,
despite its more recent reaffirmations.9 In Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin (Fisher I ), plaintiffs challenged a state’s ability to
layer consideration of race on top of a race-neutral state plan to
guarantee admission to the top 10 percent of every high school
class.10 In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II ), Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court in 2016, was willing to defer to the
educational institution’s claims that limited use of race—on top of
Texas’s 10 percent plan—was narrowly tailored to achieve its
7. Id. at 343.
8. The Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari on January 24, 2022, in a
challenge to Harvard University’s affirmative action policies. See Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harv. Coll., 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020), aff’g 397
F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022) (mem.) (No. 20-1199);
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President of Harv. Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass.
2019). The Court also granted certiorari in a challenge to the University of North Carolina’s
affirmative action program. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 1:14CV-954, 2019 WL 4773908 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2019); see also Adam Liptak & Anemona
Hartocollis, Supreme Court Will Hear Challenge to Affirmative Action at Harvard and U.N.C.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/24/us/politics/supreme-courtaffirmative-action-harvard-unc.html [https://perma.cc/FQX6-TP58]. The suit in the Harvard
case originally had the support of the Department of Justice. See Katie Benner, Justice Dept.
Backs Suit Accusing Harvard of Discriminating Against Asian-American Applicants, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/us/politics/asian-students-affirma
tive-action-harvard.html [https://perma.cc/ZMS6-97H8]. The Department of Justice has
brought further suits against universities over their use of race in admissions. See Anemona
Hartocollis, Justice Dept. Sues Yale, Citing Illegal Race Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/08/us/yale-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/
2EXE-KBLQ]. See generally Complaint, United States v. Yale Univ., No. 3:20-cv-01534 (Oct.
8, 2020). Litigation contesting the affirmative action policies at the University of North
Carolina is also ongoing.
9. See Liptak & Hartocollis, supra note 8.
10. 570 U.S. 297, 305-06 (2013).
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overall diversity goals.11 What constituted a sufficiency criterion
for incoming class diversity remained imprecise, and how much
deference to grant university officials to decide when and how consideration of race is appropriate remained contested, generating
another four-Justice dissent that motivates reconsideration of
Grutter.12 With the recent additions of Justices Kavanaugh and
Barrett replacing Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, there are additional reasons to think that the current challenges to affirmative
action may very well follow Justice O’Connor’s expectation that the
Court sunset Grutter’s central holding.13
Diversity, affirmative action’s critics continue to emphasize, is an
ad hoc standard lacking definite measurement.14 In Grutter, the
11. 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
12. Id. at 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I write separately to reaffirm that ‘a State’s use
of race in higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause....’ That constitutional imperative does not change in the face of a ‘faddish
theor[y]’ that racial discrimination may produce ‘educational benefits.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 315, 327-28 (Thomas, J., concurring))).
13. See, e.g., Nicholas Lemann, Can Affirmative Action Survive?, NEW YORKER (July 26,
2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/08/02/can-affirmative-action-survive
[https://perma.cc/762M-DF2P] (“And diversity in admissions is one Supreme Court decision
away from being prohibited in the context of race.”). Given that Justice Barrett proclaimed
her legal symbiosis with Justice Scalia during her confirmation process, there is all the more
reason to think that the Court will reconsider affirmative action: “I clerked for Justice Scalia
more than 20 years ago, but the lessons I learned still resonate. His judicial philosophy is
mine, too.” Adam Liptak, Barrett’s Record: A Conservative Who Would Push the Supreme
Court to the Right, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/amy-barrettviews-issues.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/GC
4F-54J7]. Indeed, if she adheres to Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy regarding race consciousness—which is in opposition to the view of Justice Ginsburg, whom she replaced—then
she would uphold one of his last statements on the issue: “I adhere to the view I expressed in
Grutter v. Bollinger: ‘The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of
race, and state-provided education is no exception.’” Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 315 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). And although Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter, he supported the limited
affirmative action program at the University of Texas. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214. If Justice
Kavanaugh agrees with the Grutter dissents, he would help make a six-Justice majority for
overturning Grutter.
14. For example, Justice Kennedy argued in dissent in Grutter that “the concept of critical
mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic
factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(“Stripped of its ‘critical mass’ veil, the Law School’s program is revealed as a naked effort to
achieve racial balancing.”); id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[T]he University of Michigan Law School’s mystical ‘critical mass’ justification for its
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Court accepted that imprecision was built into the concept, as the
University of Michigan Law School sought to achieve a “critical
mass” of diverse students.15 Such a “critical mass” avoids the constitutional taint of a quota, which the Court forbade in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,16 at the price of creating a sorites
paradox.17 How many students constitute a “critical mass”? Because
the University of Michigan could not say, dissenters and critics
continue to argue that diversity is a vague end to pursue in light of
its purported social costs.18 In this way, opponents continue to press
the case that affirmative action violates core principles of equality
discrimination by race challenges even the most gullible mind. The admissions statistics show
it to be a sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions.”). Subsequent dissents
in affirmative action cases echoed this reasoning. See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2222 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (“UT has not explained in anything other than the vaguest terms what it
means by ‘critical mass....’ This intentionally imprecise interest is designed to insulate UT’s
program from meaningful judicial review.”); see also Yuvraj Joshi, Measuring Diversity, 117
COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 54, 62 (2017) (“Why did the concept of critical mass prove
controversial? Part of the reason must be that critical mass has a numerical connotation yet
defies numerical definition.”).
15. See 539 U.S. at 329-33.
16. 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (plurality opinion).
17. See Dominic Hyde & Diana Raffman, Sorites Paradox, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Mar. 26, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/ [https://perma.cc/59U7ST3W] (explaining the paradox by the example that “[b]ecause the predicate ‘heap’ has
unclear boundaries, it seems that no single grain of wheat can make the difference between
a number of grains that does, and a number that does not, make a heap”).
18. “Diversity” as a basis for affirmative action is beset by a number of critical concerns.
Peter Schuck argues in terms of social cost, for example, that “[t]he benefits it confers are too
small, too arbitrarily and narrowly targeted, and too widely resented to justify the costs that
it imposes—its unfairness to other individuals, its propensity to corrupt and debase public
discourse, its incoherent programmatic categories, and its reinforcement of the pernicious and
increasingly meaningless use of race as a central principle of distributive justice rather than
the other distributive principles.” Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and
Future, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2002); see also PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA:
KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 142, 199-201 (2003). Other critics, however, point
to the social costs of relying on diversity because of its role in furthering white privilege and
failing to provide adequate benefits to students of color. See, e.g., Osamudia R. James, White
Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White Identity Formation, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 433 (2014) (exploring how “the diversity rationale is bad for white people
by undermining the development of antiracist white identity”); Derrick Bell, Diversity’s
Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003) (arguing, for example, that “[d]iversity
enables courts and policymakers to avoid addressing directly the barriers of race and class
that adversely affect so many applicants”); Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1810 (2000) (exploring reasons to think that diversity is insufficient as
a rationale for affirmative action). For the complexity of the concept of diversity, see generally,
for example, Sanford Levinson, Diversity, in WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY (2003).
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because the State must be neutral in its decision-making regarding
race.19 On this view, to fulfill a constitutional goal of colorblindness,
the Court should sunset Grutter.
Although both motive and means are available for overturning
Grutter and abandoning the diversity rationale for affirmative
action, a line of cases that developed a doctrine of equal dignity introduce a complication—and an alternative. Following a constitutional rationale that runs from Lawrence v. Texas to Obergefell v.
Hodges, the Court combined equal protection and due process
considerations to create a doctrine of equal dignity.20 As the Court
explained in Lawrence, “[e]quality of treatment and the due process
right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive
guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision
on the latter point advances both interests.”21 The tandem effects of
due process and equal protection—a “double helix” as Professor
Laurence Tribe calls them22—mean that in order to respect the
equal dignity of individual persons, state actors must not dominate
or deny central aspects of an individual’s personal identity.23 The
law must grant the equality of individual persons’ liberty to define
and present their personal identities free from government actions
that would enshrine forms of disrespect as a matter of law. Consistency would require that if law must respect a person’s sexual
orientation as a constitutive feature of personal identity, it must
also respect a person’s race as constitutive of identity too. But if race
can be a constitutive feature of a person’s identity, then mandating
colorblindness may deny a person’s equal dignity to be considered
holistically for who they are. Thus, as this Article argues, equal
19. See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution
abhors classifications based on race.... That constitutional imperative does not change in the
face of a faddish theor[y] that racial discrimination may produce educational benefits.”
(alteration in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
20. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2608 (2015).
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
22. Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004); see also Kenji Yoshino, The New
Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2011) (“I refer to such hybrid equality/liberty
claims as ‘dignity’ claims.”).
23. On the nondomination ideal, see PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 46-47, 50 (2012).
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dignity introduces a complication for colorblindness and opens up an
alternative constitutional framework applicable even if the Court
were to abandon the central holding of Grutter that a state can have
a compelling interest in pursuing diversity.24
Three broad outcomes could follow from the pending opportunity
for the Court to reconsider Grutter. First, following cases like Fisher
II, the Court might reaffirm its core holding and continue to accept
that achieving diversity is a compelling end that justifies limited
and contextual consideration of race as a factor in admissions decisions. Under this approach, the Court would likely emphasize the
nature of its fact-intensive inquiry and the obligation of institutions
to reevaluate their use of race as a factor in their decision processes.25 Second, the Court might overturn Grutter by holding that
diversity can no longer serve as a compelling state interest, and
thus would no longer justify consideration of race in admissions.
Under this reasoning, the Court would prohibit race-conscious
admissions programs as inconsistent with principles of equality,
thereby vindicating the four dissenting views in Grutter as well as
the expectations of Justice O’Connor’s proposed twenty-five-year
sunset.26
But there is a third way, which this Article seeks to chart. This
Article argues for the constitutionality of limited consideration of
race in admissions programs, premised not on achieving diversity
but on recognizing the equal dignity of persons. This third way becomes most relevant if the Court were tempted to overturn Grutter
because it demonstrates how doing so will not resolve the constitutional issues that institutional consideration of race creates. This
Article analyzes the tension that exists between the Supreme
Court’s color-blind rationale—a central pillar of the anti-affirmative-action position—and its equal dignity jurisprudence.
Members of the Court claim that a color-blind principle prohibits
24. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
25. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214-15 (2016) (“The University must continue to ...
scrutinize the fairness of its admissions program; to assess whether changing demographics
have undermined the need for a race-conscious policy; and to identify the effects, both positive
and negative, of the affirmative-action measures it deems necessary.”).
26. See 539 U.S. at 343 (expecting that in twenty-five years, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary). For an example of the Grutter dissenters’ views, see id. at 350
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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consideration of race. By contrast, the Court’s commitment to an
equal dignity jurisprudence requires legal consideration for individuals’ personal identities, which necessarily includes their sex,
sexual orientation, and race. Because strict colorblindness would
violate the equal dignity of persons, there is a looming tension internal to the Court’s jurisprudence. This Article proposes a way to
resolve this looming internal inconsistency in the Court’s jurisprudence between its pull towards a colorblindness principle and its
commitment to equal dignity. Even if the Court holds that diversity
is no longer a compelling interest, equal dignity provides an alternative doctrinal framework within which race may be considered.
The implications extend more broadly for antidiscrimination law in
general.
Equal dignity would allow government actors to consider race
when giving applicants affirmative consideration of their personal
identities in light of their social structures and histories. As this
Article introduces it, “affirmative consideration” is a process of considering the personal identities of applicants holistically in their
best light, including their personal histories and constitutive features, which necessarily might include their race. To the extent that
society continues to make race relevant to the lives of persons
through explicit and implicit institutional practices—by direct and
residual effects of past decisions and current structures—then to fail
to consider an individual as a person for whom race has mattered
would be to deny a relevant aspect of what makes them a unique
person and thus would deny them the equal dignity that due process
of law and equality protect.27 As Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter acknowledged, “one’s own, unique experience of being a racial
minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still
matters,” means that race matters for individual consideration.28 In
Fisher II, Justice Kennedy recognized that it is a continuing “challenge to our Nation’s education system to reconcile the pursuit of
diversity with the constitutional promise of equal treatment and

27. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015). Scholars have noted the
overlapping concerns of liberty and equality as well. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the
New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1541 (2002); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics
of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1696 (2008).
28. 539 U.S. at 333.
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dignity.”29 Justice Kennedy presents this constitutional promise in
part as a way to avoid harming the equal treatment and dignity of
whites while pursuing diversity. But this constitutional promise of
equal dignity likewise can provide a way to avoid harming persons
of color by denying affirmative consideration of their individual
personal identities in the name of colorblindness. Thus, within the
anti-affirmative-action jurisprudence of the Grutter dissenters lies
a tension between colorblindness and equal dignity.30
Analyzing a related tension between colorblindness and individualism, Professor Benjamin Eidelson argues that the Court’s focus on
an unexamined conception of individualism does not necessarily
entail a commitment to colorblindness in the way the Grutter dissenters believe.31 Instead, as Eidelson argues, treating people with
respect for their individuality and their autonomy may entail the
need to respect their racial identity as well.32 At the very least, he
argues, it is a more complicated issue than the dissenters acknowledge.33 But more than a potential conflict generated by a conception
of individualism, I suggest, principles of equal dignity already embed a commitment to the constitutive features and histories of
personal identity, which is unavoidably in tension with colorblindness. Moreover, as this Article argues, the Court’s doctrinal focus on
29. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214; see also Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Supreme Court,
2015 Term—Comment: Fisher’s Cautionary Tale and the Urgent Need for Equal Access to an
Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L. REV. 185, 188 (2016) (“Fisher II offers some assistance to
institutions that want to employ affirmative action, but also provides a cautionary tale about
the demanding evidentiary burden that [they] must carry to prevail.”). See generally Lani
Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Comment: Admissions Rituals as Political Acts:
Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113 (2003).
30. See Benjamin Eidelson, Respect, Individualism, and Colorblindness, 129 YALE L.J.
1600, 1672-73 (2020).
31. Id. at 1606.
32. As he argues, the idea is to open the logical space between individualism and
colorblindness. Id.
33. Professor Eidelson further argues that the Court has failed to appreciate the
significance of its commitment to individuals, which entails a commitment to autonomy and
respect, as he concludes: “[R]efusing to consider race often means refusing to treat people
respectfully as individuals, because it means ignoring a factor that illuminates the
significance of their choices and experiences.” Id. at 1672. This is a valuable insight—the more
the Court doubles down on protecting individuals, the more it must reckon with what it
means to respect individuals as autonomous agents. And the more that the Court recognizes
the need to respect autonomy, the more “attending to race will often be necessary to treating
a person respectfully as an individual.” Id. at 1607.
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the abstract concept of “individuals” is not well grounded in the
Constitution, which instead protects “persons.”34 Thus, there is a
latent tension between the Court’s unexamined assumptions concerning individualism and a more textually grounded conception
of persons.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the duty to consider applicants as individuals, not as members of groups. Justice
Scalia, for example, concurring in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, emphasized the fact that equal protection means that “[i]ndividuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination
should be made whole.”35 On this view, the Constitution’s color-blind
requirement does not allow consideration of persons by virtue of
their group classification because “at the heart of the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals.”36 Reliance on the
concept “individual,” however, is an abstraction that the Court has
never explained, even though the Constitution does explicitly guarantee equality to “persons.”37 Citizens “as individuals” mark a numerical contrast with groups, which seems to be the primary object
of this reasoning. By contrast, persons are not numerical abstractions but are constituted by complex identities and histories and set
within social structures from which their autonomous choices
emerge. Thus, an initial issue this Article analyzes is what follows
from refocusing on persons rather than individuals as a constitutive
feature of the Court’s equal dignity jurisprudence.38 Even in the
midst of moving to strictly scrutinize race-conscious government
decisions, while claiming that the Constitution focuses on “individuals,” the Court also emphasized how race-based decisions infringe
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
36. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved), 551
U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. See Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16,
17 (2015). The concept of dignity itself has an increased constitutional salience. See, e.g.,
Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 171-72 (2011);
Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19
EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 679-80 (2008) (developing conception of a minimum content for “human
dignity”); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1214 (2004).
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“‘personal rights’ to be treated with equal dignity and respect.”39
The implications of this latter commitment have gone underappreciated in a doctrinal context focused on protecting individuals
while permitting—at least for a limited time according to Grutter—
race-conscious decisions pursuing diversity.40
Reorienting antidiscrimination law in part according to equal
dignity principles would make possible the continuation of a modified form of race-conscious university admissions program, even if
the Court were to sunset Grutter’s diversity rationale. A constitutional principle of equal dignity that protects individual persons
cannot require—under the guise of equal protection—government
institutions to arbitrarily strip persons of their constitutive identities, including their race. This unexpected implication of a
commitment to the equal dignity of individual persons provides a
new grounding for race-conscious decision-making through affirmative consideration of an individual’s personal identity and
narrative history. This implication becomes most salient if the Court
were to hold—or seriously consider holding—that diversity could no
longer form a compelling state interest. Affirmative consideration
of race as a component of personal identity would now have an
alternative constitutional grounding.
This alternative grounding could have one of two effects. First, it
could dampen enthusiasm for overturning Grutter if the consequence of doing so would not eliminate race-conscious decisionmaking under a color-blind rationale but rather alter its practice.
Or, second, it could provide an entirely new analytic framework for
a post-Grutter jurisprudence. Although the first effect is entirely
speculative, the goal of this Article is to establish the constitutional
basis for the second alternative. The latter alternative also requires
reconsidering the basis on which institutions may continue to consider race. Affirmative consideration surprisingly preserves one
39. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(applying strict scrutiny to a state’s race-conscious remedial programs).
40. Others have provided similar internal critiques of the Court’s logic, focusing on the
implications of individual respect. See Eidelson, supra note 30, at 1611 (analyzing “the notion
of treating people as individuals in terms of respect for their individuality”). See generally
Deborah Hellman, Equal Protection in the Key of Respect, 123 YALE L.J. 3036 (2014). I am
focused, relatedly but distinctively, on what it means to be both textually and morally
committed to persons and the equal dignity they possess.
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feature of the Court’s doctrinal focus on individuals: it justifies
official consideration of the unique identity and history of each
person. It does not, however, readily ground overriding institutional
goals like diversity, which only have the incidental effect of considering the equal dignity of individual personal identities. Thus, as
this Article explores in Part III, there are many tantalizing questions about how the future of affirmative consideration under equal
dignity principles might develop. The focus here is on establishing
the constitutional basis for this alternative beyond Grutter.
In what follows, Part I traces a foundational commitment to
individuals and examines judicial criticism of diversity as a
compelling interest justifying race-conscious affirmative action
programs. I argue that this commitment to focusing on individuals
in the abstract is not well-grounded in either constitutional
text—which refers to persons, not individuals—or in principles of
equality. As a procedural abstraction, focusing on individuals is
inconsistent with judicial commitments to the integrity of whole
persons, who must ultimately be seen within the social settings in
which their identities have meaning. This judicial focus on individuals in abstraction is also a central component of current affirmative
action doctrine’s requirement of strict scrutiny and commitment to
a color-blind Constitution, which Part II examines. Strict scrutiny,
and the logic of colorblindness, shape which constitutional harms
become salient when government considers race. For the Court’s affirmative action opponents, harm salience, similar to commitment
to colorblindness and the asserted need for strict scrutiny, also
depends on an individual-focused analysis. As this Part concludes,
there are good reasons to be skeptical of this focus as well as its
implications. Moreover, the Court in practice often prioritizes
substantive persons and their individual identities and histories.
This inconsistent appeal to the concept of individuals provides
internal reasons for reconsidering how the Court’s equal dignity
jurisprudence, which arises within a line of cases beginning with
Lawrence v. Texas,41 focuses on the status and integrity of persons
understood for who they are within complex social and legal
contexts, not upon abstract individuals.
41. See generally 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the
Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104 (2007).
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As Part III argues, the combined principles of due process and
equal protection—equal dignity—provide a basis on which individual persons are owed affirmative consideration of their applications
in virtue of their unique personal identities and histories. Equal
dignity would be denied to persons were the State forbidden by a
color-blind principle from considering their race when it is relevant
to understanding their personal identity. In this way, a commitment
to equal dignity provides a new way of understanding how the
Constitution protects the ability for individual persons to receive
affirmative consideration of their holistic identities in university
admissions processes. Moreover, even if the sunset of Grutter
brought about the end of affirmative action as a means to the
institutional goal of diversity, it would not augur the end of race
consciousness but would allow a modified form of affirmative
action—or affirmative consideration. Justice Kennedy explained in
Fisher II that “it remains an enduring challenge to our Nation’s
education system to reconcile the pursuit of diversity with the
constitutional promise of equal treatment and dignity.”42 If this
reconciliation becomes untenable, the commitment to equal dignity
should prevail, shifting the focus not to abstract procedural individualism but to the status of persons with socially situated
identities and histories. An institution’s desire to create a diverse
student body would no longer justify the use of race consciousness
if the Court were to abandon Grutter—as Grutter itself predicted
the Court should do. Instead, equal dignity could justify continued
race consciousness to meet the demands of individual persons who
seek affirmative consideration of their identities and histories as
part of a holistic admissions process. So understood, equal dignity
forecloses a rigid commitment to color-blind constitutionalism,
permits affirmative consideration of complete persons, and makes
possible a new framework for race consciousness in official decisionmaking. Understanding the implications of Grutter’s approaching
sunset requires first understanding its grounding in a particular
conception of individuals, to which I turn in the next Part.

42. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
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I. FROM INDIVIDUAL TO PERSON
An analysis of affirmative action’s constitutionality begins with
very basic questions of political and constitutional theory. Does
equal protection apply strictly to individual persons or does it apply
across groups of persons? Supreme Court decisions have focused on
the idea that equal protection applies to individuals. But if equal
protection applies only to individual persons, how should we understand the nature of individuals? Are they abstract analytic placeholders within a broader political theory, or are they concrete
persons with unique life histories? These questions occur against an
important backdrop of debates in political philosophy that have
unfolded for centuries. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article
to intervene in these debates directly, it is important to understand
how a stated judicial commitment to “individuals” as a core concept
is but one contestable constitutional approach to equal protection.
Indeed, divergent responses to these basic questions lead to divergent approaches to affirmative action. As this Part demonstrates,
the best interpretive answer to these questions is to recognize how
equality applies to persons in their concrete and socio-legally
situated life circumstances. This recognition in turn will shape
subsequent analysis of the future of affirmative action.
A. Equal Protection and Individualism
Relying on a constitutional principle of colorblindness, Justices
voting against affirmative action programs argue that the Equal
Protection Clause protects individuals, not groups. For example,
Justice Thomas argues that “[a]t the heart of this interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the government
must treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial,
ethnic, or religious groups.”43 Even though state actions have perpetrated harms through group racial classifications, Justices who advocate for a color-blind Constitution reason that “[i]ndividuals who
have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be

43. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing
as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the
Constitution’s focus upon the individual.”44
When focusing on the affirmative action program for admissions
to the University of Michigan Law School, Justice O’Connor explained that “[t]o be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions
program must not ‘unduly burden individuals who are not members
of the favored racial and ethnic groups.’”45 This “undue burden”
analysis focuses on the likely harms that members of groups not
afforded affirmative action might suffer.46 According to the Court,
affirmative action programs “rearrange burdens and benefits on the
basis of race [that] are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by
the individuals burdened.”47 When the State acts on behalf of groups
for affirmative action on behalf of its members, on this reasoning, it
violates the constitutional status of individuals whom the Equal
Protection Clause protects.48 By contrast, in the related context of
school districting, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a majority to
explain that the Court had given its “repeated recognition that ‘[a]t
the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the
simple command that the Government must treat citizens as
individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual
or national class.’”49 As Justice Kennedy emphasized, the Constitution forbids “[r]eduction of an individual to an assigned racial
identity” because “[t]o be forced to live under a state-mandated
racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our
society.”50
Such focus upon the individual instead of groups is bound up with
a distinction between two possible principles that mediate the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.51 The antisubordination
44. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
45. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
46. Id. at 323-24.
47. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (plurality opinion).
48. See id.
49. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved), 551
U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
50. Id. at 795, 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
51. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107,
107-08 (1976); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values
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principle views the harm of inequality as perpetuating social structures that subordinate minority groups relative to the interests of
majorities.52 By contrast, the anticlassification principle argues that
the harm of inequality occurs from the continued classification of
individuals according to racial groups.53 On the latter view, the
Constitution is “color-blind.”54 But because the forbidden classifications are based on group membership, a color-blind Constitution
therefore must focus on the individual. As Justice Thomas explained regarding the use of race in school districting, “[d]isfavoring a
colorblind interpretation of the Constitution, the dissent would give
school boards a free hand to make decisions on the basis of race,”
rather than on an individual, race-blind basis.55
B. The Constitution and the Person
Starting with the Constitution’s text, so much emphasis on the
distinction between group and individual raises unexamined questions. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “nor shall any
State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”56 Despite the Court’s numerous claims that it
must uphold a constitutional duty to focus on the concept, the
Constitution does not mention individuals.57

in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472-75 (2004). See generally
Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L. REV. 895 (2016).
52. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 51, at 1472-74. For other articulations of the
antisubordination principle, see generally J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE
L.J. 2313 (1997); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410
(1994).
53. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12; Charles Fried, The
Supreme Court, 1989 Term—Comment: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of
Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107, 107-09 (1990) (advocating individualist approach).
54. A “color-blind” constitutional principle can trace its genealogy to Justice Harlan’s
dissent in Plessy (but so too can the antisubordination principle). Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens.”).
55. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. See id.
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At first blush, the terms “person” and “individual” would seem to
be interchangeable. A person is an individual, not a group, and the
Constitution protects persons as individuals. But the opponents of
affirmative action do not articulate the point quite this way. The
term “individual” is not simply a synonym for “person.” The term
“individual” is an abstraction that applies more broadly than does
“person,” for we can refer to all kinds of things as individuals that
are not also persons. The individual collie, for example, who is to be
differentiated from the breed, collie. Individuals, not groups, are an
abstraction referring to number, not to the kind of thing under
consideration.58 A constitutional person is a special kind of being—a
human being, or perhaps a legal fiction for an entity that has legal
standing—who (or which) receives protection under the law.59
Persons are bearers of rights who are individuated from one another, but are also capable of assembling together, for example as
guaranteed by the First Amendment.60 Persons also appear as
constitutional collectives. “We the People” ordain and establish the
Constitution, and the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments
protect the rights “of the people.”61 Nowhere does the Constitution
speak of “individuals.” The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
provide that no “person” be deprived of “life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”62 The textual bearer of rights is
“person,” not “individual.” In both singular and plural, “person” and
“people” constitute the bearers of constitutional rights that include
those of equality and due process. They also constitute the selfgoverning political body in whom sovereignty resides and through
whom republican government exists.63
58. This distinction touches on deeper philosophical issues about the relation between
individuation and personhood that go beyond the scope of this discussion. See generally DEREK
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984); P. F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS: AN ESSAY IN DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS (1959); BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 1956-1972 (1973).
59. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (declaring
corporations are persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also L. L. Fuller,
Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 372 (1930).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
61. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. amends. II, IV, IX.
62. Id. amends. V, XIV.
63. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 383 (1819). See generally
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
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But the slip from “person” to “individual” is easy to make. For
example, an early case in developing a modern equal protection
doctrine, Shelley v. Kraemer, explained that “[t]he rights created by
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms,
guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal
rights.”64 Such reasoning is at least in part meant to signify more
precisely the nature of who bears the right to equality—a singular
person, not a group. And opposition to affirmative action on the
Court is united behind the idea that “[r]ace-based assignments
embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their
race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts—their very worth as
citizens—according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the Constitution.”65 Similarly, as we have seen, Justice
Scalia emphasized the “individual” in his concurrence in Adarand,
claiming: “Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial
discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution
there can be no such thing as either a creditor or debtor race. That
concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the individual.”66
The appeal to credit and debt is meant to foreclose the idea that
government actors might remedy past discriminatory practices
perpetrated against particular individuals with future-oriented
preferential programs benefitting members of groups. For such an
outspoken adherent to textualism and originalism, however, Justice
Scalia curiously argues that the Constitution is focused upon the
“individual” rather than the term it actually uses, “person.”67 What
might this mean? No doubt, Justice Scalia seems to contrast the
numeric individual with the plural group. But then, “person” is
singular too.

64. 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (emphasis added).
65. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2221 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995)).
66. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). Prior to joining the Court, Scalia had similarly argued that “[affirmative
action] is based upon concepts of racial indebtedness and racial entitlement rather than
individual worth and individual need ... [and] is racist.” Antonin Scalia, Commentary, The
Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race,” 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 153-54.
67. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (1997).
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The numerical meaning is further evident in Adarand, where
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, reasoned that any racial
classification warrants the strictest scrutiny, and claimed that “the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not groups.”68 The Court clearly is capable of making linguistic
distinctions between protecting persons and protecting individuals—and therefore seems to use the terms interchangeably.69 For
example, the Court explained the meaning of equal protection in
terms of a “simple command that the [g]overnment must treat
citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial,
religious, sexual or national class.”70 Given the seemingly easy
linguistic interchangeability between the two terms, even when
employing the word “person” to make the contrast with “groups” the
Court might mean no more than the numeric abstraction of “individuals.”71 So in at least some usages, the Court might employ both
“individual” and “person” either as numeric designations or procedural abstractions. But by using the phrase “citizens as individuals,” the Court also implicitly acknowledged that there are different
ways that persons or citizens can be “treated as,” or “seen as”—
citizens as voters, for example.72 As a result, by using “individual”
in place of “person,” the Court implicitly recognized that a person is
more than an opposition to a “group,” but carries with it more
meaningful sense of identity beyond numeric individuation or procedural abstraction.73

68. 515 U.S. at 227. Note, however, that three pages prior, the Court cited favorably
Justice Powell’s discussion of “the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against
classifications based upon his racial or ethnic background.” Id. at 224 (quoting Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978)).
69. Id.
70. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
71. See, e.g., Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir. 1997) (“That the
Fourteenth Amendment affords individuals, not groups, the right to demand equal protection
is a fundamental first principle of ‘conventional’ equal protection jurisprudence.”).
72. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 911.
73. See id.
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C. Why Focusing on “Persons” Rather Than “Individuals” Matters
If more than a numeric designation, what then is at stake in the
linguistic slip from “person” to “individual”? For given the Constitution’s explicit repetition of “person” in substantive contexts with
substantive meanings, a claim that the numeric individual is all
that matters to equal protection logic seems unlikely. Persons are
textual rights bearers, not individuals.74 The more plausible account
of this linguistic shift is that there are both theoretical and principled implications at stake.
In one tradition in political theory, the individual is the basic unit
of political rights which is viewed in contrast to the collective political body.75 For example, Professor Amy Gutmann writes: “Equal
regard for individuals—not identity groups—is fundamental to
democratic justice.”76
By contrast, there is an equally broad, and metaphysically rich,
philosophical tradition bound up with the determination of what it
means to be a person.77 Persons obtain and sustain their identities
within thick social and political relations with others—through
families, social communities, associations, professions, religious
communities, and the like. They are not abstractions who easily
shed their identifying features for purposes of political theory but
are identifiable within thick interpersonal relations.78 Many of these
features of personhood are also objects of special constitutional
protection. This difference between abstractions that evoke the
atomistic individual and references to concrete particularized
persons is one that also tracks a difference of approach in political
theory. In the contractarian tradition, the individual is a central
figure who is opposed to collectives, whereas in the Aristotelian and

74. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
75. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds.,
2003) (1859); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
76. AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 7 (2003).
77. See generally PARFIT, supra note 58; CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989).
78. John Rawls’s thought experiment implementing a “veil of ignorance” is one example
of reasoning from abstract individuals. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-37 (1971).
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communitarian traditions, the embedded person is the focus for
political arrangements.79
This debate in political philosophy over individualism and community is instructive for the Supreme Court’s claim that the
Constitution is focused upon the individual. One significant example
illustrates the stakes. The political philosopher John Rawls employs
a paradigmatic version of procedural individualism in his “veil of
ignorance” thought experiment.80 Individuals stripped of all knowledge about their roles, status, place, race, gender, and relative
intellectual and physical capacities within society—in short, anything that distinguishes them as distinctive and robust persons—
must choose the basic principles of political morality by which to
organize a system of justice.81 Behind the veil of ignorance, individuals become procedural abstractions through which principles of
justice can be chosen through an idealized procedural fairness in
which no person can tilt the scales in a way that would advantage
his or her position in society.82 A Rawlsian approach to the question
of affirmative action might ask whether individuals were afforded
the same opportunities for university admission, for example,
independent of their particular social experience of race. And from
that perspective it is not at all clear that such practices would be
just.83
79. For an overview, see CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 2:
PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 187-210 (1985). For contractarianism, see generally
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d
ed. 1967) (1690); RAWLS, supra note 78. For communitarianism, see generally WILL KYMLICKA,
LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?
WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1982). For contrast between liberal and communitarian approaches, see generally STEPHEN
HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM (1993).
80. RAWLS, supra note 78, at 136-37.
81. The agreements reached from this original position constitute a conception of justice
that Rawls names “justice as fairness.” Id. at 17. Justice as fairness does not consider the
actual propensities of persons or the actual distributive outcomes of any particular social
arrangement; it provides principles that regulate any given social arrangement that accepts
those principles chosen from the perspective of the original position. Id.
82. Id. at 85 (explaining the “notion of pure procedural justice”).
83. Peter Schuck, for instance, employs the veil of ignorance to argue that even with basic
knowledge of persisting racial inequalities and past legal discrimination, one who was
ignorant of her own demographic traits would not choose practices that permit allocating
resources by way of racial quotas. SCHUCK, supra note 18, at 200. Political theory advocating
more radical individualism, such as that offered by Robert Nozick, places the burden on the
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This brief foray into Rawlsian liberalism illustrates how a
decision to focus on individuals, rather than groups, is an idea with
a history and context within political philosophy. There is a family
of political theories that prioritize procedural individualism.
Because a color-blind approach to equal protection emphasizes
procedural fairness—no person should be made to be a component
of a (favored) racial group rather than be seen as an individual—it
fits within this tradition.
But does this tradition fit the Constitution? Other political
theories compete for this fit, with a possible advantage that they
focus on persons in social and political contexts, not upon individuals stripped of concrete social settings. Rawlsian liberalism has been
widely criticized because it abstracts the “individual” in a way that
no longer takes into account persons—the real focus of the law’s protection.84 Philosopher Michael Sandel, among others, has argued
that law and political morality protect persons, and persons can only
be understood in their rich contextual locations in a web of social
and cultural practices that provide meaning to the story of their
lives.85 To be a person is already to be irreducibly imbued with
shared practices that give meaning and substance to who one is.
Thus, to reason over a procedural abstraction such as the “individual” is to have ceased talking about real, socially embedded persons.
Sandel is not alone in his criticism as there are many other theorists
who focus on the socially embedded nature of persons.86
My aim is not to enter this debate in political philosophy on one
side but rather to note that the choice between individual and person as the object of judicial vision arises from a deeper philosophical
context that also has practical consequences. Those consequences
are found in the procedural abstraction of the individual as opposed
to the substantive robustness of the person.

state to justify interference with core individual rights retained in isolation and separation
from political institutions and other persons. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA,
at ix (1974).
84. See SANDEL, supra note 79, at 15-17.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 208-09
(1990); NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE “POSTSOCIALIST”
CONDITION 5-7 (1997); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 1-9 (1997).
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D. How Emphasizing the Constitution’s Textual Reference to
“Person” Provides a Better Interpretive Approach
A Supreme Court that sees its role as treating procedural
“individuals” will respond differently to the claims brought before
it than one that sees its role as treating substantively complex
“persons.” The latter will be more attentive to the ways in which
“racial, religious, sexual or national class,”87 for example, figure into
the lives of persons.88 Given the political theoretical context just
sketched, a choice to emphasize one of these concepts reveals
deeper—and rivalrous—theoretical commitments not found on the
surface of the constitutional text even though they also have
practical implications.89
To focus on an Equal Protection Clause that prioritizes individuals risks smuggling a version of procedural individualism into a
Constitution that is better understood as textually committed to
substantive persons.90 This textual commitment to persons, however, does not require adherence to any particular political theory,
even if it fits well with theories that emphasize the moral significance of socially situated persons. Rather, because the Court has
never explained the basis for its reliance on “individuals,” the
textual point casts doubt on whether a commitment to individualism
follows from an equal protection focused on protecting persons.
By contrast, focusing textually on the equality of “persons” invites the Court to attend to the substantive features that constitute
a person. Because constitutional text and precedent recognize that
persons are self-governing sovereigns who are bearers of rights
87. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
88. One need not be a communitarian to accept the socially and politically embedded
importance of persons. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 72.
89. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1751 (2007);
Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1984) (“[W]hile the
broad language of the Constitution delegates to judges the power to make [interpretative
decisions], their major premises come from such extra-textual sources as judicial precedent
and the practices and ideals of social life.”); Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution,
57 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (2007); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 4-8 (2008).
90. See Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1000-04 (2007) (tracing the history and observing the
link between individualism and colorblindness).
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capable of forming collectives, the burden of argumentation is on
those seeking to limit equality to abstract, procedural individuals—a burden which has not been taken up.91 Instead, it is a more
natural reading of the constitutional significance of “person” to
allow that to be a substantive person means having complex grouprelated identities such as race.92 One such group is “citizen,” which
the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes in the same section in which
it protects “persons.”93 And indeed, the Court implicitly recognized
this point when it explained that “[g]overnment must treat citizens
as individuals.”94 Rather than an abstract placeholder for purposes
of ascribing political rights, this substantive content aids in
understanding how equal protection applies to persons who are
constituted by their group identities and affiliations, as well as their
social contexts and personal histories. Both text and precedent
therefore support a more complex understanding of the “persons”
protected by equal protection and due process than abstract individualism would seem to allow.
Even if an abstracted commitment to analyzing “individuals”
rather than “persons” were a better approach, unexpected implications follow. Professor Eidelson argues that by emphasizing the
equal protection of “individuals,” the Court becomes committed to
a principle that “respecting people as individuals should be understood to mean respecting people as autonomous ... [and] requires us
to take their past self-definitional and self-expressive choices
seriously,” which includes their racial identities.95 On this account,
a central feature of focusing on individuals becomes the moral
imperative to treat them with respect as fully autonomous agents
capable of self-definition. A doctrine of equal protection individualism, on this view, will therefore have the unexpected consequence
of requiring attention to race when relevant as a constitutive
91. For cases on the people as sovereign and associational rights, see, for example, Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
92. Chief Justice John Marshall admonished that words in the Constitution should be
given a natural interpretation. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819)
(“Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the mind, in all situations, one single definite idea.”).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
94. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (emphasis added) (quoting Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
95. Eidelson, supra note 30, at 1635.
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feature of an individual’s autonomous self.96 If individualism is
better understood to entail a substantive autonomy that opens up
consideration of race, then a substantive commitment to protecting
persons and their complex and situated personal identities should
be even better situated—textually and conceptually—to demonstrate the inadequacy of the principle of colorblindness.97
These two textual points therefore converge—that individuals are
persons and that persons should be understood to be the substantive
bearers of constitutional rights—to explain the unexpected significance of the Court’s repeated claim that the Constitution protects
the equality of individuals. Although used as a way to limit the
possibility of race-conscious decision-making, a constitutional commitment to “individuals” as a way of protecting “persons” also
implies the necessity of race-conscious decision-making when race
matters to the substantive identities of persons.98 To foreshadow the
argument in later Sections, a commitment to individual persons also
implicates the correlative duty to recognize the equal dignity of
complete, substantive persons who have particular identities and
histories—a duty the Court has recognized in its equal dignity jurisprudence.99
The future of affirmative action—beyond the possibility that
Grutter v. Bollinger’s central holding might sunset—begins with
these unanticipated constitutional consequences that flow from a
focus on the equal dignity of individual persons. To develop this
implication, it is important to see first how the Court combines a
focus on individuals with a color-blind rationale under strict scrutiny to create a rationale for a time-limited acceptance of diversity
as a compelling interest for affirmative action.
The next Part explores this connection between scrutiny and
procedural individualism in light of the Court’s skepticism about the
constitutionality of race-conscious government decisions. As the
next Part examines, the Court’s commitment to the equality of
individuals, when viewed in its doctrinal context, also provides—
96. Id. at 1672 (“[R]efusing to consider race often means refusing to treat people
respectfully as individuals, because it means ignoring a factor that illuminates the
significance of their choices and experiences.”).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See infra Part III.A.
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unexpected and unanticipated—grounds for protecting substantive
personal identities, not merely abstracted individuals. The more the
Court is committed to focusing on individuals, the more the Court
will need to be committed to the equal dignity of persons.
II. THE LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE
The Court developed this textual distinction between individual
and person within the context of affirmative action doctrine—and its
competing principles—in a line of cases stretching back to Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke and extending to government contracting cases.100 When Chief Justice Roberts or Justice
Thomas speak of antidiscrimination as a form of colorblindness,
they construe the meaning of equality in light of a commitment to
a particular theory that starts from a premise about individuals.
Focusing on individuals avoids allowing government to create
favored and disfavored groups, members of the Court reason, and
raises questions of fairness and harm to majority populations said
to be “disfavored” by such programs.101 From strict scrutiny to
questions about sorting “favored” groups from “disfavored,” this
commitment to individualism and colorblindness grounds the claim
that affirmative action will be subject to future constitutional reconsideration under Grutter. It is therefore important to understand
how this commitment to individualism is also in tension with its
own values in ways that open up the possibility of unanticipated
constitutional implications. As this Part argues, within existing
doctrine, the Court’s emphasis on protecting individuals is complicated by its protections for substantive persons. The priority of
persons becomes most clear in unraveling what the Court’s dissenters see as the primary harm in affirmative action and is in tension
with a principle of colorblindness. As the argument unfolds, the unanticipated implications arise from emphasizing the equal dignity
100. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(affirmative action); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (city contracting).
101. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003) (“Petitioner further alleged that her
application was rejected because the Law School uses race as a ‘predominant’ factor, giving
applicants who belong to certain minority groups ‘a significantly greater chance of admission
than students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups.’”).
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of individual persons who cannot be abstracted from their personal—and racial—identities, thereby altering the consequences of
reconsidering Grutter.
A. Affirmative Action Through the Lens of Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court’s affirmative action doctrine holds that equal
protection permits state actors to consider “race only as one factor”
which admits of a “plus” in an applicant’s file for university admissions.102 This justification first appeared in the Court’s initial
affirmative action case, Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, which makes use of both the idea that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects “individuals” and the idea that race—a group
classification—can be relevant to assessing those “individuals.”103 In
Bakke, Justice Powell described the kind of permissible admissions
program as one that employs race as a “plus factor,” while looking
to many other factors of the individual’s application relevant to an
admissions decision: “[A]n admissions program operated in this
way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity
in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to
place them on the same footing for consideration .... This kind of
program treats each applicant as an individual.”104 Endorsing
Justice Powell’s reasoning, Justice O’Connor reaffirmed in Grutter
that “[u]niversities can ... consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as
a ‘plus’ factor in the context of individualized consideration of each
and every applicant.”105
The idea of a “plus” is set in contrast to the system the University
of California, Davis had established, which led to the decision in
Bakke. There, California had set aside a number of seats for its
medical school specifically for the recruitment and admission of
minority candidates, citing the institution’s own past racial discrimination in denying admission opportunities to minority
applicants on an equal basis.106 In this way, California sought both

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18.
Id.
Id.
539 U.S. at 334.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-06.
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to increase the number of minority students and to remedy its own
past practices.107 For the Court, however, a set-aside of a particular
number of seats—in this case, sixteen—created a “quota,” the use
of which offended the Constitution because “it is a line drawn on the
basis of race and ethnic status.”108 Citing favorably the claim from
Shelley v. Kraemer that the “rights created by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual,”109 the Court reasoned that “[t]he guarantee of equal
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another color. If
both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.”110
All seats in the University of California Medical School must be
open equally to all applicants, no matter the particular institutional
history or educational goals. There cannot be separate seats assigned on the basis of race or ethnicity.
In Grutter, Justice O’Connor grappled with the idea that a
percentage of seats in an incoming class might form a “critical mass”
of minority students in order to achieve the institution’s goal of
admitting a diverse class across multiple criteria.111 The University
of Michigan’s “critical mass” was not a quota, Justice O’Connor
reasoned, because it was neither a fixed number nor an exclusive
admissions track demarcated by race.112 Rather, critical mass was
“defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce.”113 Moreover, the benefits of diversity are
substantial, creating a compelling educational interest.114 Noting
“the overriding importance of preparing students for work and
citizenship,” the Court reasoned that rather than creating a roadblock to a more equal and united citizenry, limited consideration of
race and ethnicity in admissions decisions furthers a shared interest
in equality.115 “Effective participation by members of all racial and

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See id.
Id. at 289.
Id. (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
Id. at 289-90.
539 U.S. 306, 329-30 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 329-30.
Id. at 331.
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ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream
of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”116 For a law school to
provide future professional and civic leaders representative of the
broader society, it must admit a diverse student body that signals
the openness of America’s civic and professional positions to all. To
achieve this openness, therefore, the University of Michigan Law
School had a compelling interest in a limited, narrowly tailored
consideration of race, necessary only because of background social
circumstances that continue to make race relevant. The Court
reached this conclusion in Grutter despite its commitment to strictly
scrutinize any government use of race, skeptical that legitimate
uses exist.117
In two cases, City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. and Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court established a doctrine of
strictly scrutinizing affirmative action programs, holding that
“because classifications based on race are potentially so harmful to
the entire body politic,” they “are simply too pernicious to permit
any but the most exact connection between justification and classification.”118 Therefore, the Court concluded in Adarand that “all
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny.”119 Under this standard, government actors must
demonstrate that they act upon compelling government interests
using a means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.120 In one
stroke, in terms of judicial analysis, the Court equated, Jim Crow
and remedial affirmative action programs.121 Government purpose—
whether subordinating or facilitating—must be scrutinized for

116. Id. at 332.
117. See id. at 343.
118. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (citing Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). See generally City of Richmond
v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
119. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
120. See id.
121. This move in itself is highly suspect in that it ignores the fact that strict scrutiny has
been used to “smoke out” invidious discrimination, which requires looking to purpose; and if
we look at purpose, affirmative action does not have the purpose of subordinating whites in
the way that segregation had with regard to Black people. See Jed Rubenfeld, Essay,
Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436, 443 (1997).
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whether the classification is narrowly tailored to achieve what the
Court agrees is a compelling purpose.122
In employing strict scrutiny, the Court’s presumption is against
the state’s use of race on the belief that there are few legitimate
uses of race in official decision-making.123 The Court requires that
“the means chosen ‘fit’ th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is
little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”124 The Court seeks to
“smoke out” potential illegitimate motive by strictly scrutinizing the
reasons government actors give for their use of race.125 And although
there may be a difference between racist exclusion and antisubordination inclusion, the Court adheres to a doctrinal need for
“consistency” in its standard of review, motivated by a default principle of colorblindness.126
Race-blind programs receive no heightened scrutiny for what
social or personal harms they might overlook, or even inadvertently
perpetuate. Only if officials attempt to see whether subordinating
social structures are relevant to holistic decisions about individual
persons do their actions warrant strict scrutiny, with its presumption of being “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”127 Approaching equal
protection through an antisubordination principle would allow government to recognize the different ways that race might factor in
122. Hellman, supra note 51, at 915.
123. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1276
(2007); see also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 834-37 (2006).
124. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
125. See id. at 326; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
126. Justice Stevens’s dissent argued that consistency “does not justify treating differences
as though they were similarities” because there is an important difference between a “‘No
Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Of course, this is precisely the question that divides the Court.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text. An anticaste or antisubordination equality
principle focused on the motive and effects of government use of race is capable of seeing the
difference between “no trespassing” and a welcome mat. The motives and effects of such “no
trespassing” laws are to create a caste system based on group status, denying to some their
equal standing, respect, and dignity in society. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 63;
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1195 (2002).
127. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978) (plurality opinion)).

34

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:001

official decision-making depending upon whether the effects
subordinate one group to the interests of another in ways constitutive of caste structures. Absent searching analysis, subordinating
structures can continue to produce inequality long after the motives
of those who set them in motion have faded and despite the present
intentions of those who inadvertently perpetuate them.128 Nonetheless, because the Court reviews race-conscious affirmative action
programs through the lens of strict scrutiny, the effect is to prioritize colorblindness as the default equality principle, which forecloses
purposeful antisubordination action.129
Strict scrutiny is necessary, as the Court explains, because when
government deviates from treating persons as individuals in order
to recognize their racial group classification, there is a risk that
decisions might be based on “illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”130 Grutter’s likely demise is predicated on this commitment to
strictly scrutinize the use of race-consciousness, no matter the
potential benign antisubordination purpose. In this way, the Court
engages in strict scrutiny to protect individuals and to promote a
color-blind Constitution. The final piece of this analytic triad requires understanding the internal tensions inherent within a
principle of colorblindness.
B. The Logic of Colorblindness
Justice Harlan provided an early articulation of colorblindness
logic in Plessy v. Ferguson, explaining that “[o]ur Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.
In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.”131 A
“color-blind” principle of equality focuses on a state’s obligation not
to consider race in official decisions, and thereby cuts off the epistemic route necessary to producing classes of citizens made unequal

128. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 52, at 2313, 2316, 2318-20; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness
as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1768 (1993); DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM:
HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE 108-20 (2014).
129. See Harris, supra note 128, at 1768.
130. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (citing City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989) (plurality opinion)).
131. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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on account of racial criteria.132 If official decision-making cannot
know a person’s race, then from a state of blindness, it cannot
conduct invidious discrimination.133 This principle, the Court reasons, justifies imposing strict scrutiny on all government uses of
race because the background presupposition is that race should not
be a factor in government decisions.134 As the Court explained in a
non-affirmative-action discrimination case, appeals to race or
ethnicity
are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate
state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in
the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For
these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be
soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subject[ ] to
strict scrutiny.135

As Owen Fiss commented, in conjunction with such rationales,
Justice Harlan’s colorblindness metaphor “has played a dominant
role in the interpretation of anti-discrimination prohibitions.”136
Colorblindness thus can have great appeal. It creates a simple
imperative—do not make discriminations on the basis of race.137 It
132. See generally Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It Learned
from the Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459, 479-80 (1997); ANDREW KULL, THE COLORBLIND CONSTITUTION (1992).
133. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved), 551
U.S. 701, 758 (2007).
134. As Justice Thomas explained, “[m]y view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view
in Plessy: ‘Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.’” Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
135. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
136. Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 235 (1971).
Fiss continued, noting that “[t]he effect of blindness is to treat all colors as normative
equivalents, and thus the metaphor is particularly handy in expressing an opposition to
increased enforcement on the ground that such enforcement will result in preferential
treatment for [B]lacks.” Id. at 236; see also López, supra note 90, at 988 (“By reactionary
colorblindness I mean an anticlassification understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that
accords race-conscious remedies and racial subjugation the same level of constitutional
hostility.”).
137. Chief Justice Roberts summed up this view, as we have seen, by proclaiming that
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748; see also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir.
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also aligns closely with the Court’s emphasis on the individual to
the exclusion of group-based reasoning. Because race is a group
characteristic, colorblindness reinforces a focus upon the individual.138 By adopting the perspective of blindness, a more equal
treatment of individuals as individuated from each other only
according to job-relevant, or education-relevant, merit characteristics is said to follow. As Robert Post observes, the logic is that
“[b]lindness renders forbidden characteristics invisible; it requires
employers to base their judgments instead upon the [supposed]
deeper and more fundamental ground of ‘individual merit’ or
‘intrinsic worth.’”139 In this way, the logic of colorblindness works
like a prophylactic, requiring individuals to be separated from
constitutive aspects of their identities in order to ensure that
irrelevant characteristics do not factor into official decision-making.
Blindness is also a way of avoiding constitutional harms.
Discrimination harms individual persons not only by depriving
them of access to education or employment but also by denying
them equal standing within society. Discrimination deprives
persons of their dignity, imposing a status-based harm upon their
ability to conduct their public lives as equal to others.140 If a necessary condition for imposing such status-based and dignitary
1996) (“The use of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply achieves a student body that
looks different. Such a criterion is no more rational on its own terms than would be choices
based upon the physical size or blood type of applicants.”); Posner, supra note 53, at 25. For
further analysis of what is at stake between anticlassification and antisubordination
principles, see generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights
Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9 (2003).
138. As Siegel explains:
For many, the belief that anticlassification commitments are fundamental
entails the view that our tradition embraces a particular conception of equality,
one that is committed to individuals rather than to groups. On this account, the
tradition’s embrace of the anticlassification principle signifies its repudiation of
an alternative conception of equal protection, the antisubordination principle:
the conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce
the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups.
Siegel, supra note 51, at 1472-73. Advocates of individual-based approaches reject groupbased equality. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander, Equal Protection and the Irrelevance of
“Groups,” in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION
THEORY 1, 4, 12 (2002).
139. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000).
140. See Henry, supra note 38, at 204-05.
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harms is knowledge of a person’s race, then blindness is one way of
cutting off the route to such harmful discrimination.141 If government officials lack authorization to know and act upon a person’s
race, then they cannot deny or denigrate them on the basis of
prejudicial views about group status.142
In both the context of university admissions and government
contracts, strict adherence to the colorblindness principle entails
that constitutional harm can arise from the mere use of racial
classifications. Justice O’Connor puts the point like this in Adarand:
“[W]henever the government treats any person unequally because
of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls
squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection.”143 Such a constitutional injury arises,
on this view, from the preferential treatment persons receive
because of their race and from the relative disfavor others suffer
based on their racial identity.144 As Justice Powell emphasized in
Bakke, “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”145 Constitutional
harm also occurs from a denial of the full benefits of individual
desert or merit other applicants experience on account of their
majority status.146
What makes Grutter controversial is the Court’s willingness to
admit that white applicants suffer a constitutional injury, but that
compelling state interests override that harm.147 In this way Grutter
strikes a constitutional balance. A right to equal treatment is

141. As Post observes, “[a]ntidiscrimination law seeks to neutralize widespread forms of
prejudice that pervasively disadvantage persons based upon inaccurate judgments about their
worth or capacities.” Post, supra note 139, at 8.
142. See id. at 11.
143. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995).
144. See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 184 (2016).
145. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978) (quoting
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
146. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
147. Using this logic, which ignores purpose in assessing harm, Jed Rubenfeld suggests
that invidious discrimination could also be justified. For example, we might imagine
discriminating against Black people in an invidious manner and justifying such a practice by
strong arguments about compelling state interests. Rubenfeld, supra note 121, at 463-64; see
also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
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burdened, but the benefits flowing from state’s compelling diversity
goals outweigh the incidental individual harms.148
Critics claim that affirmative action imposes harms simply
because particular individuals, by virtue of their group identity,
receive preferential treatment at the expense of “innocent persons.”149 Beginning with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, Justices
critical of affirmative action have asserted that “there is a measure
of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent’s position to
bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making.”150
And in response to arguments about structural remedies for discriminatory social structures, the Court explained that “as the basis
for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against
innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and overexpansive.”151 The idea is that corrective justice conflicts with
distributive considerations to prevent third parties (white applicants) who are innocent of perpetrating any racial harms from
bearing the costs of remedying the negative structural effects on
minorities. As Justice Stewart explained, dissenting in another
affirmative action case, “[e]xcept to make whole the identified
victims of racial discrimination, the guarantee of equal protection
prohibits the government from taking detrimental action against
innocent people on the basis of the sins of others of their own
race.”152
A fundamental idea about equality and fairness embedded in this
reasoning is that innocent individuals are denied “preferential
treatment.”153 Opponents of affirmative action argue that to give
preference to one person on the basis of race amounts to a zero-sum
tradeoff in which a member of the nonpreferred race is harmed.154
148. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
149. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
150. Id.
151. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion).
152. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 530 n.12 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
153. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1997) (considering
California’s Proposition 209 and asking “whether a burden of achieving race-based or genderbased preferential treatment can deny individuals equal protection of the laws”).
154. The Ninth Circuit puts the point like this:
Proposition 209 amends the California Constitution simply to prohibit state
discrimination against or preferential treatment to any person on account of race
or gender. Plaintiffs charge that this ban on unequal treatment denies members
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Thus, the question of preferential treatment of some applicants
because of their race is, from a color-blind perspective, an easy case
of inequality, and thus imposes constitutional harm on those not
afforded preference.155 By contrast, no individual is harmed, according to this reasoning, when the State forbids affirmative consideration of their race.
When the State sought to remedy the effects of past social and
political racial subordinations, affirmative action skeptics on the
Court were not only concerned about the costs to the innocent, but
also the resentment and division it could cause. Using the language
of preferences, Justice Kennedy was particularly concerned about
the harms of racial division that affirmative action programs can
cause.156 He suggested, “[p]referment by race, when resorted to by
the State, can be the most divisive of all policies, containing within
it the potential to destroy confidence in the Constitution and in the
idea of equality.”157 This divisiveness can produce not only backlash
but racial conflict because of the State’s use of race to classify
individuals.158 This concern has been part of the Court’s reasoning
of certain races and one gender equal protection of the laws. If merely stating
this alleged equal protection violation does not suffice to refute it, the central
tenet of the Equal Protection Clause teeters on the brink of incoherence.
Id. at 702.
155. Similar criticisms are leveled against the Texas plan that adds limited raceconsciousness on top of its 10 percent plan. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of
Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289,
292 (2001) (“[T]here is something wrong, indeed, unconstitutional, with a legislative motive
to increase the percentage of one racial group in a state university at the expense of
another.”).
156. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly
reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead
to a politics of racial hostility.”); see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (“Racial
gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions;
it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer
matters.”).
157. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy sounded this same note in Parents Involved, arguing that “[t]o be forced to live under
a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society....
Governmental classifications that command people to march in different directions based on
racial typologies can cause a new divisiveness.” 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See generally Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781 (2006).
158. See generally Siegel, supra note 157.
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since Bakke, where Justice Powell reasoned that “[a]ll state-imposed
classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits on the basis of
race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individuals
burdened. The denial to innocent persons of equal rights and
opportunities may outrage those so deprived and therefore may be
perceived as invidious.”159 Moreover, Justice Powell explained, “[o]ne
should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and the perception of mistreatment that accompanies, a system of allocating
benefits and privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic
origin.”160 As Reva Siegel argues, rather than anticlassification, the
theory that seems to best account for the Court’s argument about
division and what she labels “social cohesion” is a concern about balkanization.161 Racial classifications are harmful because the State
risks creating or exacerbating racial difference and conflict in the
name of trying to remedy racially unequal social structures.162
Resentment and division can be avoided, some Justices argue, by
strictly scrutinizing even purported “benign” consideration of race.163
Closely related to claims that affirmative action risks harming
innocent persons and producing social divisiveness is the additional
claim that such practices are simply unfair. Giving some applicants
extra consideration simply on account of their race would seem to
violate a core idea that persons should be evaluated on the basis of
their individual merits, not their group membership. Justice Powell
refers to the “inherent[ ] unfair[ness]” such consideration perpetrates.164 Justice Powell explained that this perception has broader
social effects because affirmative action programs that use quotas
“will be viewed as inherently unfair by the public generally as well
as by applicants for admission to state universities.”165 Claims of
159. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (plurality opinion).
160. Id.
161. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 1300 (“Justices reasoning from this antibalkanization
perspective enforce the Equal Protection Clause with attention to the forms of estrangement
that both racial stratification and practices of racial remediation may engender.”). Justice
Kennedy, for example, argued that without strict scrutiny of university race-based decisions,
“[t]he unhappy consequence will be to perpetuate the hostilities that proper consideration of
race is designed to avoid.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
162. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 1300.
163. Id.
164. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 n.53.
165. Id. Justice Kennedy echoed this reasoning, suggesting that “[p]rospective students,
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unfairness arise because an individual’s race cannot be grounds for
a meritorious decision about the personal achievements and accomplishments on which university admissions are otherwise based.166
On the Court, critics of affirmative action argue that all of these
harms—costs to innocents, racial division and backlash, and
unfairness—can be remedied by focusing on color-blind consideration of individuals.167 It is the very use of race—the existence of
race consciousness as part of an admissions process—that colorblindness remedies.168 If race is no longer a factor in decisions—
whether invidious or affirmative—then the state cannot harm
innocents, produce social division and related backlash politics, or
perpetuate a perception of procedural unfairness.169
In a quest to avoid these constitutional harms, the Court’s
commitment to colorblindness entails not only blindness to race but
blindness to how social context relates to personal identity. If race
were nothing more than a superficial feature of a person’s appearance, then colorblindness might entail no costs. But because race
also has social meaning, then the logic of blindness entails a failure
to see socially salient aspects of the lives of individual persons.170
When considering the complexity of personal identity, race derives
meaning from socially and historically embedded contexts that tell
the story of how the status of a group affects the dignity of the
person.171 To be blind to race is to be blind to these background
contexts that constitute in part the meaning and experience of
the courts, and the public can demand that the State and its law schools prove their process
is fair and constitutional in every phase of implementation.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 45 (2013). (“[T]he Court has
devised a new body of strict scrutiny law designed to constrain the means by which
government promotes diversity or pursues remedial ends that is focused on protecting
expectations of fair dealing that citizens have in interacting with the government.”).
167. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Eidelson, supra note 30, at 1644-45.
171. That race is at least partially the product of legal and social construction is a widely
accepted thesis. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE 3-4, 9-10, 19 (1996). See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD:
CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN TWO AMERICAN CENTURIES (1998). Indeed, Critical Race
Theorists see one task of theory as unmasking the legal and political structures that
construct, and subordinate, Black people as a race.
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personal identity. When government institutions seek to counter
residual social structures that perpetuate the effects of past
discriminatory practices through affirmative action, for example,
they rely on seeing the relevance and reality of how race functions
within a complex social and historical context.172 To be blind to race
is therefore to be blind to social structure.173
Blindness to social structure also allows surface neutrality to hide
underlying practices that have discriminatory effects.174 In Washington v. Davis, the Court concluded that when a state’s policy is
facially color-blind, a plaintiff claiming a violation of equal protection must demonstrate that any resulting disparate racial effects
were in fact intended.175 A bad government actor can be unmasked
as merely appearing to be color-blind, but absent evidence that
racial discrimination was the intended effect, the Court in disparate
impact cases does not look beyond the surface neutrality of a job
qualification.176 In this way, the Court’s doctrine requires blindness
to race insofar as race is understood in its social, cultural, and
political contexts that form possible bases for differential impact.177
It is worth noting that policing, by contrast, provides an important
social structure in which race remains relevant, and in which race—
as a group classification—can be used in the evaluation of individuals, with no accompanying claim of unconstitutionality by those
members of the Court most wedded to a color-blind Constitution.178
172. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 136, at 240.
173. See id.
174. See generally Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round
Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003).
175. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
176. When social stratification is attacked for its visible effects, the Court can retreat to
the realm of the “inner” intentional or purposive realm. Reva Siegel calls this kind of shift
“preservation-through-transformation.” Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113
(1997).
177. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 245 (“[W]e have difficulty understanding how a law establishing
a racially neutral qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory.”); see
also Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (“[E]ven if a neutral law has a
disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.”).
178. See, for example, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Whren v. United States. 517
U.S. 806, 812 (1996) (“We flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip
the agents of their legal justification” even if officers are motivated by racial animus); see also
Brown v. City of Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a suspect
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Even for those committed to the principle, colorblindness is not
always required.
If social structure is irrelevant to equality, then colorblindness
entails seeing race as a surface phenomenon, rather than a
constitutive aspect of personal identity. As a concept, the individual
already requires abstracting away thicker personal identities,
including classifications within racial groups. It also excludes other
personal or socially relevant group identities, such as sex, thereby
making consideration of broader contexts and social structures
irrelevant.179 Individuals are enumerated within a polity as political
participants, but they are not articulated as bearers of social
meanings.180 The individual stripped of any place in which to be
historically and socially embedded can thus only be an abstract,
procedural individual. The meaning of the individual becomes a
social—and constitutional—placeholder, who has rights to equal
process without regard to the underlying personal substance.181
In this way, colorblindness and individualism are mutually
reinforcing doctrinal concepts. The unresolved question is whether
blind individualism is a sound basis for resolving questions of
identification using race “is not a suspect classification, but rather a legitimate classification
of suspects”); United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen officers
compile several reasons before initiating an interview, as long as some of those reasons are
legitimate, there is no Equal Protection violation.” (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977))); United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 n.2 (8th Cir.
1992) (ruling that there is no constitutional problem if “race, when coupled with the other
factors ... relied upon, was a factor in the decision” to detain and question a Black passenger);
R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine
and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1077, 1087 (2001); Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping
Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105
CALIF. L. REV. 125, 127 (2017) (arguing that Fourth Amendment law permits police
interactions that have the possibility of leading to violence); Siegel, supra note 4, at 1361-62.
179. This view is also aligned with neoliberalism, or a new Lochnerism, subject to criticism
because “in a world where racial stratification remains pervasive and tracks economic and
educational inequality, this form of constitutional individualism can also be terribly
unrealistic, even intellectually dishonest.” Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism:
Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 212 (2014) (citing DARIA
ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE
108-20 (2014)).
180. Id.
181. Robert Post asks a relevant skeptical question: “In what sense does a person without
an appearance remain a person?” Post, supra note 139, at 12. As Post observes, the desire to
achieve a fully abstracted individual is in tension with the need to protect persons from a
denial of equal protection.
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equality that also analytically rely on more substantive conceptions
of persons and personal identity.182 If individualism were to prove
in practice to be an insufficient conceptual bearer of constitutional
rights, then colorblindness would fail as the appropriate principle
of equal protection.
C. Affirmative Action Jurisprudence and the Priority of Persons
By adopting blindness to both social structures and personal
characteristics—both of which are relevant to race—a principle of
colorblindness is in tension with constitutional protections for persons who have personal identities and histories. These protections
are implicit within existing affirmative action doctrine.
Complexity and unresolved tension within the Court’s commitment to procedural individualism and colorblindness provide
internal doctrinal openings for the Court to move beyond the Grutter
framework in affirmative action cases. Even within existing affirmative action doctrine, the Court makes use of a more substantive
understanding of persons than its statements about the priority of
individuals would suggest. A closer look at the Court’s reasoning in
Grutter and Fisher II reveals a more complicated story—one that
recognizes the constitutional significance of persons, not simply individuals, who are embedded within complex social structures and
practices.183
182. Although one strategy might be to provide an internal critique of the Court’s
commitment to individuals, and thereby attempt to redefine what “individual” means within
the doctrine, my approach is to take seriously the Court’s commitment to abstract individuals
as a way to highlight the tension between constitutional visibility of substantive “persons”
(and their equal dignity) and doctrinal colorblindness. By contrast, see Eidelson, supra note
30, at 1603 (“[O]ffering a new analytical framework for understanding, and then evaluating,
a central pillar in the standard case for colorblindness: the claim that race-based state action
wrongfully fails to treat people as individuals.”).
183. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Elise C. Boddie, Response, The Future of
Affirmative Action, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 38, 39 (2016) (“[W]e should put an end to the fiction
fostered by the Supreme Court for the last several decades that colorblindness is an appropriate response to our racial problems.... [W]e [should] focus on building a society that is more
open, inclusive, and welcoming of racial and ethnic differences.” (footnote omitted) (first citing
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993); and then citing Thomas J. Sugrue, Less Separate,
Still Unequal: Diversity and Equality in “Post-Civil Rights,” in OUR COMPELLING INTERESTS:
THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY FOR DEMOCRACY AND A PROSPEROUS SOCIETY 47 (Earl Lewis &
Nancy Carter eds., 2016))).
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First, in response to the criticism that affirmative action harms
some to benefit others, the Court in Grutter and Fisher II allowed
the continued use of race because of the widely dispersed educational benefits that diversity achieves.184 In Fisher II, the Court
examined a University of Texas plan that overlaid a limited,
holistic, race-conscious admission policy on top of the state’s “race
neutral” 10 percent plan whereby the top 10 percent of each high
school graduating class was eligible for admission.185 The Court
explained that “the compelling interest that justifies consideration
of race in college admissions is not an interest in enrolling a certain
number of minority students. Rather, a university may institute a
race-conscious admissions program as a means of obtaining ‘the
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.’”186 This
forward-looking rationale is consistent with Justice O’Connor’s
attention in Grutter to business and military amici who argued that
higher education provided benefits to institutions downstream by
educating those who could serve as future leaders.187 Everyone
gains—students of color and whites alike—from the benefits of
affirmative action, including those institutions who depend upon a
diverse graduate pool for employment and leadership. Correlatively,
no individual loses. These gains are systemic and structural and
apply to the substantive development of persons within complex
social settings. Thus, even though colorblindness reasoning seeks to
deny the relevance of social structure, the Court recognizes the
value of affirmative action in relation to educational benefits that
flow to downstream institutions.188
Second, in justifying affirmative action’s aims in Grutter and
Fisher II, the Court did not rely entirely upon a color-blind principle
of equality. Instead, antisubordination reasoning allowed the Court
to see how background social structures create differences on the
184. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 1214-15; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
185. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2209-10.
186. Id. at 2210 (quoting Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013)).
187. See, 539 U.S. at 328. As Justice Kennedy explained, “enrolling a diverse student body
‘promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables
students to better understand persons of different races.’” Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). Justice Kennedy further explained: “Equally important,
‘student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society.’” Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
188. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210.
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basis of race that are relevant to university admissions decisions.189
Institutional structures upstream from the university may embed
distributional inequalities that downstream actors should be entitled to remedy—or at least not be obligated to perpetuate.
Constitutionally mandated blindness risks reifying those unequal
upstream structures within a university’s own admissions practices.190 Thus, the “educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity” can be experienced not only by the students themselves,
but by downstream institutions that rely on the educational
achievements of those students.191 Moreover, to justify blindness by
claiming that a focus on individuals implies that there can be no
creditor and debtor race—as the Court has done—risks ignoring
difference under a false claim of sameness.192 Thus, in the name of
remaining blind to race, or neutral in its decision-making, an
institution risks perpetuating the effects of more disparate discriminatory social structures.193 So long as race continues to matter to the
lives of persons—a proposition that Justice O’Connor’s Grutter
opinion affirmed194—the “neutral” equal merit admissions story
embeds upstream institutional practices and histories that can have
differential effects on the basis of group identity, group preferences,
and group advantages.195 In contrast to a diversity rationale, in such
circumstances everyone would be made worse off through inconsistent recognition of holistic personal identities.

189. See id.
190. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Cover-Blindness, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 65 (2000).
191. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 310).
192. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring);
see also Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 581-84 (1982).
193. See Harris, supra note 128, at 1768 (“This protection of the property interest in
whiteness is achieved by embracing the norm of colorblindness.”); Neil Gotanda, A Critique
of “Our Constitution is Color-blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1991) (“[T]he Court relies
increasingly on the formal-race concept of race, a vision of race as unconnected to the
historical reality of Black oppression.”); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law:
How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF.
L. REV. 77, 87 (2000) (demonstrating “how color blindness discourse both constrains and
legitimates practices that maintain racial stratification”).
194. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (noting “one’s own, unique experience
of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still
matters”).
195. On the supposed neutrality of whiteness, see Harris, supra note 128, at 1771.
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Third, by focusing on third-party harms, the Court’s harmavoidance anti-affirmative-action reasoning does not rely on
abstract individualism but embeds a substantive conception of
persons. In order to make sense of the purported harms to innocent,
primarily white, applicants, the Court employs a social imaginary
of a substantive person possessing qualities and achievements
within social structures that warrant meritorious consideration.196
The merits of any applicant will require attention to particular
grades, as well as their cultivated mixture of community service,
extracurricular activities, athletic endeavors, and life experiences
such as semester studies abroad. As Justice O’Connor explained,
“[t]o be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program
must not ‘unduly burden individuals who are not members of the
favored racial and ethnic groups’” because of the burdens it places
on consideration of the merits of their full personal identities.197
Discounting personal achievements in order to prioritize race would
count as unduly burdening individuals only in light of their complex
personal identities and stories that exclude reference to race.198 This
reasoning, however, relies upon a substantive conception of persons,
not upon equality as procedural individualism.199 This substantive
account of merit is grounded in institutional structures and practices from which persons lay claim to achievements and activities
that make them qualified for admission. In this way, a constitutional narrative that focuses on substantive persons, rather than
procedural individuals, seems unavoidable even under a purported
color-blind Constitution focused on individuals.200
The supposed “preferential treatment” afforded members of a
“favored race” is likewise applied to concrete persons who have
narratives of personal achievement. Because both past de jure and
de facto discriminatory practices have had the effect of shaping
social structures that are capable of perpetuating discriminatory
effects, the story of the achievement of any applicant’s life is set
196. See CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 24 (2004).
197. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
198. See id.
199. See Eidelson, supra note 30, at 1644-45 (discussing how considering one’s race might
be required to respect one’s autonomy).
200. See id.

48

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:001

against the backdrop of that larger narrative.201 Using race as a
proxy for that fuller narrative allows the university to cognize the
substantive narrative identity of a particular applicant without
every applicant having to trace that common racial history anew in
their applications. But if consideration of substantive persons and
their complex identities and histories is unavoidable, then without
race consciousness, the story of some persons’ lives may be incomplete, and thus, in a paradoxical outcome, the individual merits
valued by the focus on race-neutral criteria would be undermined.
If strict scrutiny eventually leads the Court to reject Grutter’s
central holding, then the Court will have to confront the conflict
within its own color-blind doctrine—how to reconcile a commitment
to individuals with a selective blindness to personal identities and
narratives that include race within a social and historical context.202
Colorblindness would produce a new inequality of individual narrative. When racial identity is important to understanding the
personal identity of some applicants, to be race-blind would deny
them full consideration of who they are.203 By contrast, other
applicants for whom race is not similarly relevant would enjoy full
consideration of all the relevant features of their personal identities
and histories. Colorblindness is not blind to personal histories
relevant to ascertaining merit within institutional and social structures that do not facially consider race but nonetheless have racial
effects. To be race-blind in admissions decisions when background
social structures have made race relevant in the lives of individual
persons would produce disparate impacts along racial classifications
and risk replicating the discriminatory social and political structures perpetuated in other institutional settings.204
Thus, the doctrinal rationales under which Grutter would sunset—relying on individualism and colorblindness—are internally
inconsistent.205 The Court’s affirmative action dissenters rely on
substantive consideration of persons with their complex personal
201. See Siegel, supra note 51, at 1505; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 350-51
(1987); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 776-78.
202. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 238.
203. See Siegel, supra note 193, at 87.
204. See id. at 106.
205. See id.
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and social histories set within institutional frameworks in order to
analyze the harm of affirmative action.206 But when race is a
component of a person’s complex personal and social history, the dissenters claim that applicants must be considered as abstract
individuals and, thus, institutions must remain blind to personal
and social histories when it comes to considering race in a positive
light as a feature of personal identity. Selective individualism as a
basis for colorblindness is inconsistent with prioritizing substantive persons, and the latter concept has a firmer constitutional
grounding.207
Having declared a constitutional emphasis on individuals, the
Court must grapple with the implication of its jurisprudence that “it
demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry
instead of by his or her own ... essential qualities.”208 Persons have
“essential qualities” not captured by procedural individualism.209 If
admissions decisions are about concrete persons rather than procedural individuals, then some personal history must matter.210 As
this Article will explain more fully in what follows, the Court’s
commitment to the Constitution’s protection for the “dignity and
worth of a person” provides a constitutional basis for going beyond
the color-blind logic of procedural individualism.211 It would be
arbitrary, if not invidious, to suggest that race cannot be considered
as part of a person’s identity when social and political structures
have continued to make racial classifications matter. Likewise, if
social structure is relevant to an analysis of the purported harms
affirmative action perpetrates, then social structure cannot be legitimately excluded as a basis for analyzing the merits of race
consciousness. Thus, as this Part has examined, the logic of the
Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence contains internal openings
more consistent with a Constitution that prioritizes substantive
persons over abstract procedural individuals. And persons have
206. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
208. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000).
209. See id.
210. For the related argument that a commitment to individuals entails a particular
understanding of autonomous individuals as worthy of respect, see Eidelson, supra note 30,
at 1634-40.
211. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 517.
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personal and social histories that include their experience as members of racial minorities.
As Part III argues, there are underexplored implications of the
Court’s equal dignity jurisprudence that provide a way to ground a
new approach to individual persons in antidiscrimination law. The
promise of equal protection is that government actions should
respect the status and dignity of persons. This promise is one way
of articulating this principle—key to the holding of Lawrence v.
Texas—that government may not use its laws or exercise official
discretion in ways that demean or disparage others based on their
status.212 One implication of this reasoning is that government
officials also have an obligation to see each person in his or her best
light, not in a light colored by demeaning stereotypes or statusbased classifications. If equal protection applies to “persons” and if
rights of the people are held in virtue of their unique characteristics—the “dimensions of freedom” as Justice Kennedy has called
them213—then it would seem that there is a governing obligation to
see persons in their best light. What this means is that the state
must treat all persons alike as equal citizens who are co-equal
participants in democratic self-government. Even within a purported color-blind Constitution, aspects of personal identity that
social practices continue to make relevant—such as race—cannot
become factors which the state can use to demean the dignity and
respect of persons. Constitutional conflict arises because affirmative
action enables officials to see the personal stories of applicants in
their best light, whereas colorblindness denies this ability. Such a
dignity-based principle that persons should be afforded a “best light”
presumption has important implications for the future of affirmative action, as the next Section explores. This future is better
captured, as Part III argues, through an alternative practice of
affirmative consideration.

212. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); see also Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The
Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 32, 41 (2009).
213. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
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III. AFFIRMATIVE CONSIDERATION UNDER DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION
A primary rationale Justice O’Connor identified that would motivate a future Court to overturn Grutter’s central holding is the
expectation that social conditions would change over time, allowing
the Court to revert to a color-blind Constitution focused on protecting individuals.214 But what does the Court mean by focusing on the
equality of individuals? This Article has examined the Court’s inconsistent treatment of individuals, creating an unexpected opening for
new doctrinal development. Mired in what may be an unarticulated
commitment to a particular form of political liberalism, members of
the Court want holistic consideration of individuals and their merits
in university decision processes, but also want that consideration to
be blind—and thus less than holistic—to the personal, social, and
historical reality of race for persons of color. How might the Court
determine the future of Grutter if its commitment to individuals
were itself inconsistent with blindness—a result that the permissibility of using race in suspect identifications also entails? This
Part argues the principle of equal dignity for persons—to which the
Court is also committed as a constitutional principle of equality and
due process—protects individual persons while avoiding the
limitations a color-blind Constitution would impose. Whereas the
prior Part analyzed tension internal to the individual-focused colorblind rationale for overturning Grutter, this Part analyzes the tensions that exist between different, but related, doctrines of equal
protection. In both cases, the internal tensions open the possibility
for prioritizing the equal dignity of persons across doctrinal
domains.
The future of affirmative action can be resolved, not by resisting,
but by embracing and expanding a commitment to constitutional
protections for individual persons. There is no need to call for a
return to group-based equal protection principles.215 If the Constitution focuses on protecting persons, then it cannot exclude government consideration of personal identity, which includes a person’s
214. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
215. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 51, at 147.
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personal, social, and historical experiences of race.216 To this end,
equal protection is not the only constitutional doctrine relevant to
the antidiscrimination question of how the state may permissibly
see and respond to persons in virtue of their group identity status.
When it comes to status-enforcing policies and laws, the Equal
Protection Clause works in tandem with the Due Process Clause to
protect persons against group-based, worst-light discrimination.217
This constitutional combination creates new ways to incorporate
group-based claims into person-focused doctrine.218 It thereby offers
a new grounding for affirmative action programs with a shift in
focus.219 Rather than permitting institutions to seek their own goals
of maintaining a diverse student body, equal dignity justifies raceconscious decisions to further affirmative consideration of whole
persons.220 Affirmative consideration allows institutions to see the
identities, histories, and achievements of persons in their best light
without excluding their racial identities. Affirmative action has
been about the goals of institutions that make the decisions, but
equal dignity shifts the focus to the individual persons seeking to
have decisions made based on an affirmative consideration of their
full personal identities.221 To explain the basis for this shift—and its
significance for the future of affirmative action—I turn to a line of
cases from Loving v. Virginia to Obergefell v. Hodges, which develop
this new equal dignity jurisprudence.222 When it comes to statusenforcing policies and laws, the Equal Protection Clause works in
tandem with the Due Process Clause to protect persons against
group-identity, worst-light discrimination.
Indeed, the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence regarding raceconscious practices embeds the ideal of equal dignity. As Justice
Kennedy explained for the Court regarding antidiscrimination,
“[o]ne of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden
classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person
216. See Fiss, supra note 136, at 238, 244.
217. See Yoshino, supra note 22, at 749-50; Tribe, supra note 22, at 1902-03.
218. See Yoshino, supra note 22, at 776.
219. See id. at 767-68.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015).
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to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and
essential qualities.”223 Moreover, in Croson, the Court argued that
race-based decisions infringe “‘personal rights’ to be treated with
equal dignity and respect.”224 This principle suggests that recognition of the value of equal dignity is at the heart of the Court’s
limitations on the use of race.225 And where the Court argues that
consideration of race is inherently suspect and harmful, a right to
be treated with equal dignity requires consideration of a person as
a whole, for government officials must accord each person “respect
based on the unique personality each of us possesses, a respect the
Constitution itself secures in its concern for persons and citizens.”226
Treating persons with equal dignity with respect for their unique
personality would have to include affirmative consideration of their
racial identity. This tension will have to be reconciled if the Court
seeks to move beyond its holding in Grutter v. Bollinger.227 Given the
Constitution’s protection for persons and the Court’s equal dignity
jurisprudence, the way forward is to provide affirmative consideration of the dignity of each person’s identity. To do so means abandoning any strict adherence to a color-blind Constitution and to
procedural individualism. In this Part, I explain how this works and
why it matters.
A. Equal Dignity
Although this doctrinal tandem between due process and equal
protection has a genealogy tracing back to earlier cases—most
notably, Loving v. Virginia228—the contemporary emergence of due
process analysis as a way of protecting individual persons in virtue
of a group classification begins with Lawrence v. Texas.229 A central
principle of this new due process jurisprudence is that the State
may not perpetrate status-based harms against homosexual persons
in ways that “demean their existence or control their destiny by
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000).
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
See id.
Rice, 528 U.S. at 517.
See 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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making their private sexual conduct a crime.”230 That is, the State
may not use its power to declare particular acts criminal in order to
demean or dominate individuals based upon their group status.231
On the basis of this reasoning in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy argues
that the State may not “control a personal relationship that,
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within
the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”232 Indeed, “[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by
the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation
to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public
and in the private spheres.”233 It functions, as such, as an invitation
to discriminate because the State uses its power to shape how
persons, in virtue of their group identities, are to be seen by the law,
and by extension, by society at large.234 This power to shape the
status of persons in virtue of their personal relationships risks
allowing the State to become “a dominant presence” over important
“spheres of our lives and existence” in ways that are inimical to the
liberty protected by the Constitution.235 This liberty protects the
equal status of individuals to be free from State domination over
their personal identities and relations.
Adhering to this central equality insight, Justice O’Connor,
writing in concurrence, observed that the Texas law “brands all
homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for
homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as everyone else.”236
Relying on an equality argument alone, however, would license the
State to control aspects of personal relations so long as they do so
equally for all. But, Justice Kennedy explained, equal protection is
not enough because “[i]f protected conduct is made criminal and the
law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity,
its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for
equal protection reasons.”237 In the case of some behaviors, facial
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 575.
See id.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 575 (majority opinion).
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equality may hide deep inequality. After all, a law against sleeping
under a bridge applies equally to rich and poor alike.238 In order to
combat this ability to target essential features of a person’s identity
through facially neutral means, such as outlawing all acts of
sodomy, Justice Kennedy argued that due process serves both
liberty and equality by protecting the freedom of all persons to enter
into personal relations of their choice—a liberty that also provides
equal standing under the law.239 He explained that “[e]quality of
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both
interests.”240 Under this majority approach, the interests of equality
can be advanced through the ways that due process can protect the
status of persons in virtue of their identities and relationships.241
One feature of the Court’s reliance on due process liberty in this
context is that it avoids having to confront the issue of whether to
grant greater scrutiny to discrimination based on sexual orientation.
It substitutes an individual dignity principle for any need to probe
further a possible “group disadvantaging principle.”242 The Court
explained that the state should not be able to define the meaning of
personal relationships, acknowledging that “adults may choose to
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”243 By
focusing upon the dignitary interests at stake in the liberty to
choose a person’s intimate relationships, the Court avoided the
rational basis implication of equal protection doctrine. Under the
Court’s tiered-scrutiny approach, group-based discrimination on the
basis of a person’s sexual orientation would warrant only a rational
basis review—a level of scrutiny that is highly deferential to any
238. The quip is Anatole France’s, who wrote of “the majestic equality of the laws, which
forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their
bread.” ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (New York, Boni & Livelight, Inc. 1894). On the
idea that equality lacks substance in such a way as to perpetuate inequality, see Westen,
supra note 192, at 575; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Essay, Substantive Equality: A
Perspective, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011).
239. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. The latter is proposed by Fiss, supra note 51, at 108.
243. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
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legitimate state interest.244 Instead, the Court is able to recognize
how focusing on the individual person provides a way of protecting
equality.245 Such a strategy draws on precedent, utilizing an
approach developed in earlier civil rights cases. In Loving, for
example, the Court recognized both that equality was at issue in
Virginia’s antimiscegenation law and that the State’s claim that it
honored formal equality—insofar as neither Black people nor white
people could marry each other—was not enough to overcome the
dignitary nondomination interests involved in the liberty to choose
a marital partner.246 By combining liberty and equality claims in a
manner that Professor Laurence Tribe refers to as a “legal double
helix,”247 the Lawrence Court protected the integrity of groups by
protecting the dignity of persons.248
Combining the concerns in Lawrence and Loving, the Court extended due process protections against government laws that have
the purpose and effect of stigmatizing individuals on the basis of
their choice of marital partner. Justice Kennedy reasoned that this
stigma impacts the dignity of persons that both liberty and equality
protect.249 The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) sought to deny
federal recognition of same-sex marriages that an increasing number of states sought to legitimate.250 As the Court reasoned, “[t]he
avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are
to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon
all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”251 By recognizing that the “purpose
244. See id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245. See id. at 578 (majority opinion).
246. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“To deny this fundamental freedom on so
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications
so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment,
is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.”).
247. Tribe, supra note 22, at 1898. As Tribe further explains, Lawrence is an “unfolding tale
of equal liberty and increasingly universal dignity.” Id.
248. Others have examined the Court’s shift from equality to liberty in earlier cases. See,
e.g., Brown, supra note 27, at 1541; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and
Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1216 (2000).
249. See Siegel, supra note 27, at 1696 (explaining how due process provides “constitutional
protections for dignity”).
250. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744 (2013).
251. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770.
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and practical effect” of DOMA was to impose a stigma that disrespected the “equal dignity of same-sex marriages,”252 Justice Kennedy’s reasoning again prioritized personal liberty as a way of
protecting equality. Using Lawrence’s logic, Justice Kennedy
explained how protecting due process liberty advances the interests
of equality as well.253 Stigma that undermines personal dignity
imposes harms through how it affects the many dimensions of
personal life that both due process and equality protect. These
protections go beyond ensuring that the law addresses abstract
individuals through formal procedural processes. Rather, these
protections are aimed at the substantive capabilities and possibilities of the whole person within social and legal structures that
have the power to shape their self-understandings.
By protecting liberty as a way of providing equality, the Court
focused upon the effects to persons within same-sex marriages as a
way of considering same-sex couples as a group.254 Congress’s
“purpose and effect to disparage and to injure” persons on the basis
of their choice of marital partner, the Court concluded, had no
legitimate purpose in denying the legal status of marriages that
states “sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”255 Part of the
harm wrought by DOMA, the Court explained, was that “it tells
[same-sex] couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid
marriages are unworthy of federal recognition.”256 Under DOMA,
same-sex couples were to be seen under the law as unequal, having
a status inferior to others.257 The federal objective was to shape a
way of seeing same-sex marital relations by failing to recognize
them at all—a form of marital blindness. By creating differential
marriage regimes under federal law, it placed same-sex couples in
a “second-tier marriage,” and it “demean[ed] the couple, whose
moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects, and whose
relationship the State has sought to dignify.”258 Moreover, its effects
were felt by other family members because it “humiliate[d] tens of
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
See id.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples.”259 As
the Court explained, DOMA produced these harms to the personal
identities of those who make choices about their intimate relationships within social and legal structures that have the power to
define their status in ways that can demean, dominate, and humiliate (or validate and celebrate).260 Using this political and legal
power to define groups as comprised of subordinate relationships
demeans the persons who constitute the group classification. By
intertwining due process with equal protection, the Court is able to
protect persons by virtue of their group status by scrutinizing the
effects of government recognition or blindness. It is also able to
empower advocates to bring about both political and legal change on
the basis of constitutional meanings implemented in individual
state practice with national consequences.261
Utilizing this reasoning, the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges took
the next step in declaring that no unit of government—states
included—could violate a fundamental right to marry by withholding marriage licenses from same-sex couples.262 In concluding that
the Constitution grants same-sex couples a right to “equal dignity
in the eyes of the law,”263 the Court further entrenched the due
process right to equal dignity in constitutional law.264 Even in
articulating the scope of due process protections in a case about
unequal treatment between same-sex and opposite-sex couples,
Justice Kennedy explained that “these liberties extend to certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices that define personal identity and
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and
Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 610 (2015) (describing how Windsor “cleared the channel for
political change”). The Court’s opinion might also depend upon its contingent historical
setting. See Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality,
127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 130 (2013). On the role of state law in shaping rights claims, see
generally Ernest A. Young, United States v. Windsor and the Role of State Law in Defining
Rights Claims, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 39 (2013).
262. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 38, at 17 (Obergefell “tightly wound the double helix of Due
Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity ... [and] lays the groundwork for
an ongoing constitutional dialogue about fundamental rights and the meaning of equality”);
see also Robinson, supra note 144, at 158.
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beliefs.”265 The social and personal role of marriage is one that the
Court has consistently protected in recognition of the fact that
“[c]hoices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny.”266 Due
process focuses attention on individual persons—their choices and
the social and political meanings law confers upon those choices.267
But autonomous choice by itself does not capture the further ways
laws administered unequally based upon group status harm personal dignity. It is worth quoting at length the Court’s explanation
of how due process and equal protection interact:
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are
connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent
principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to
the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one
Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a
more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses
may converge in the identification and definition of the right.268

When government action impacts personal decisions and the
identity from which they flow and which they form, the Due Process
Clause can protect “freedom in all of its dimensions” even if not
explicitly enumerated, such as the right to marry.269 But the full
meaning of that right requires recognition of the way that equality
protects those personal decisions against status-based laws that
demean and disparage them. The Court concluded this articulation
of the “interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards”270 by
explaining that “[t]his interrelation of the two principles furthers
our understanding of what freedom is and must become.”271 When
a state seeks to perpetuate its own judgments about the social
265. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (first citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972); and then citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965)).
266. Id. at 2599; see also Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right to Marry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1691,
1739-41 (2016). See generally Kerry Abrams, The Rights of Marriage: Obergefell, Din, and the
Future of Constitutional Family Law, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (2018).
267. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602-03.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 2598.
270. Id. at 2604.
271. Id. at 2603.
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meaning and status of same-sex relationships in ways that create
social hierarchy by depriving them of access to marital recognition,
“[t]he imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to
disrespect and subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause,
like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement
of the fundamental right to marry.”272
In the parlance of equal protection theory, Justice Kennedy is
clearly relying on an antisubordination rationale.273 A state may not
use its laws and procedures to impose a subordinate status on
persons by virtue of their sexual orientation—their group classification.274 But the opinion ultimately concluded that there is a
fundamental right to marry applicable to same-sex couples on the
same basis, and without stigma, to opposite-sex couples.275 Such a
fundamental right resides in personal liberty, not in group classification.276 In addition to protecting due process liberty, the Constitution protects equal dignity in the personal bond that marriage
represents.277
By protecting the dignitary interests in personal relationships,
the Court also fulfills a preference for focusing constitutional
protection on individual persons, not groups. To hold that individual
persons are entitled to heightened scrutiny under equal protection
would have the effect of making available more group-based civil
rights litigation to protect the status of persons on the basis of their
sexual orientation. As in the case of Loving, although state laws
that seek to disadvantage persons on the basis of their group status
are at issue (race or sexual orientation), the presence of individual
decisions focuses constitutional protection on the particular narratives of how states can shape the personal lives of those it demeans
through its inequality. In this way, the Due Process Clause provides
a constitutional basis for prioritizing the ways that law and legal

272. Id. at 2604 (first citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-88 (1978); and then
citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
273. See Siegel, supra note 27, at 1704.
274. Kenji Yoshino calls this “antisubordination liberty.” Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of
Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 174 (2015).
275. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
276. See id. at 2597-2605.
277. See id. at 2597-98.
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actors perceive the status of those who apply for benefits the state
provides, such as the granting of marriage licenses.
B. Equal Dignity, Dimensions of Freedom, and Affirmative
Consideration
In the Lawrence to Obergefell line of cases, the Court through
Justice Kennedy not only developed and enriched the constitutional
meanings of due process and equality but provided a structure and
logic for how to relate questions about individual persons with those
about group identities. By examining how the intersection of liberty
and equality have effects on personal dignity, the Court explained
how the Constitution protects individual persons in virtue of their
group status.278 Same-sex couples as a group must be treated equally because of the way that discriminatory state action dominates
both their liberty of choice and their personal dignity.279 Individual
persons, not groups, experience the stigmatic harms states perpetuate by discriminating against same-sex couples.
Although seemingly disparate doctrinal areas, the same argument structure should also apply to university admissions processes
that seek to engage in a form of affirmative action. The interaction
of equality and due process in the line of cases from Lawrence to
Obergefell provides a new way to explain how race-conscious admissions programs can be consistent with the Constitution—even
if the practice of affirmative action requires a new constitutional
grounding and a modified orientation. Not simply a matter of intratextual analysis, nor merely an argument about consistency across
doctrinal domains,280 the Court’s focus on individuals and equal
dignity makes available a new foundation for affirmative action.
Here is how.

278. See generally id.; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
279. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
280. On intratextualism, see Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 796
(1999) [hereinafter Intratextualism]; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 45 (2000). On the ideal of interpretive consistency, see
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 130-35 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 83 (1996).
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Focusing on liberty allows individual persons to make claims
about how the State should view their group identity—as homosexual persons, for example—in ways that both exemplify a best-light
obligation and provide a model for affirmative consideration of race.
When it comes to marriage, the Court held that state arguments for
maintaining the traditional status quo by not extending positive
recognition to same-sex marriages were insufficient in light of the
dignitary costs borne by individual persons.281 If applied to university admissions, by analogy, any argument that color-blind admissions reflect a neutral evaluation of a social structure status quo
would be insufficient in light of the distributive costs imposed on
individual persons. The status quo distributes social benefits and
burdens in ways that may include unfair procedures, stigma,
stereotypes, and other forms of social harms persons of color may
suffer. State action that reflected a social structure perpetuating
unequal group status, as the Court argued in Lawrence, would
violate a substantive liberty interest by embedding a subordinating
social structure through law.282 For that reason, Justice Kennedy’s
opinion rejected Justice O’Connor’s proposed equal protection approach in Lawrence as insufficient by itself.283 Treating persons of
unequal social standing as if they were equal risks perpetuating
stigmatizing social structures. By analogy, if universities make admissions decisions under a color-blind law which does not examine
the substance of the underlying social structure, deprivations of
liberty and dominating practices might nonetheless remain even if
formal equal protection exists.284
Due process deprivations would remain when the social structure
embeds differential status—economic, social, and political—that
offends the dignitary interests of persons who are seeking recognition of their application in its best light. It would offend the dignity
of individuals to have social structure make their race relevant to
their institutional and everyday experiences but then deny that
their race is relevant to an assessment of those very experiences in
favor of the status quo reflected in test scores, grades, and the
281.
282.
283.
284.

See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597-2605.
See 539 U.S. at 575-76.
See id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See Eidelson, supra note 30, at 1644-45.
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like.285 Race as a social fact would matter to the personal experiences that compose a person’s identity, but that same identity would
then face constitutional denial for the sake of a supposed neutral,
formal equality pursuant to a principle of colorblindness. Such
denials of identity—whether through criminal subordination, as in
Lawrence, or blind erasure—can offend the dignity of individuals.
The Due Process Clause protects the liberty of individuals to make
choices and pursue personal projects on an equal standing with
others. Blindness can become a tool for dominating a person’s
identity by imposing limits on who persons can present themselves
as being in their best light.
In the case of DOMA or a state’s refusal to recognize same-sex
marriage, the state action occurs when a person is denied equal
liberty in their choice of marital partner.286 In this respect, there is
no similar state action in the affirmative action context. In fact,
states like Michigan and Texas defended the legitimacy of considering race as a positive factor in a multifactor decision process aimed
at achieving diversity.287 White applicants who challenge affirmative
action cannot legitimately argue that any harms they suffer are
stigmatic or subordinating. The claimed constitutional harm of
affirmative action occurs because state actors consider the race of
others in the best light.288 Thus, when the Court foretells the future
doctrinal demise of affirmative action, it contemplates replacing an
ability to see individual applicants in light of their complex personal
and social histories with blindness.289 Such blindness, however,
would not produce substantive equality but would risk offending
equal dignity by failing to focus on substantive persons.
In this way, blind individualism may itself constitute state action
that denies the equal dignity of each person to tell her story in its
best light.290 Judicially enforced blindness would create a doctrinal

285. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 319
(1999).
286. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 763-69 (2013).
287. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 314 (2003); Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 305-06
(2013); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2211 (2016).
288. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317; Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207.
289. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207.
290. See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 130-31
(arguing the related point that the State might be required to practice affirmative action).
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paradox. By doctrinal rule, states would be forbidden from seeing
applicants in their best light—in a light that tells a story about who
a person is and how race matters to a person’s individual selfidentity. Such a result would mandate a particular way of seeing
race (or rather, not seeing race) that paradoxically would undermine
equal dignity by erasing the very individualism that the Court’s
conservative majority has prioritized since Croson.291 States would
be required to focus on individuals, not groups, but would be
forbidden from affirmative consideration of constitutive features of
individual experiences and identities. Under this approach, the
Court would construct the Constitution paradoxically both to protect
individuals and to be blind to individuals. Such a result would
produce inconsistent application of equal dignity across related
doctrinal areas.
Resolving this doctrinal paradox leads to a new way of understanding the constitutional status of race-conscious admissions
programs. By foregrounding the equal dignity of substantive
persons, judicial doctrine can realize the Constitution’s protections
for individuals, while avoiding turning colorblindness into a means
of entrenching racially distributed social structures.
Affirmative action programs can promote equal dignity by refusing to entrench background social structures that have the effect
of producing continuing inequality on the basis of race. An appropriately designed admissions process that is race conscious can
afford individual persons the ability to tell their stories in a way
that includes the shared story of race in American society and can
commit state actors to seeing race as a feature of a person’s life
worthy of consideration in its best light. If the Supreme Court were
to prioritize color-blind equal protection over protection for equal
dignity, these stories would be censored and individual persons
would be denied full recognition.292 In the name of protecting
291. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(reasoning that government must treat “all candidates individually, rather than making the
color of an applicant’s skin the sole relevant consideration”).
292. This reasoning was important to Judge Burroughs’s opinion holding that there is no
unconstitutional racial bias against Asian Americans in Harvard’s admissions program. See
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harv. Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126,
194-95 (D. Mass. 2019). Judge Burroughs reasoned:
[I]t is vital that Asian Americans and other racial minorities be able to discuss
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individuals against groups, colorblindness would undermine actual
persons in the name of abstract individualism.
Because opposition to the constitutionality of affirmative action
programs arises from abstract individualism, then its paradoxical
failure means that the Court does not have good grounds for
abandoning Grutter’s holding that limited race-conscious decisionmaking is consistent with equality. The question then becomes how
to understand this limited race consciousness in light of its new
constitutional foundation under an equal dignity principle.
Where affirmative action is susceptible to the problems of thirdparty harms and white backlash under equal protection alone,
following the reasoning of Lawrence and its progeny, these problems
do not arise under a principle of equal dignity. Seeing individual
applicants in their best light, which includes their race as a constitutive feature of their personal identities, does not deny any other
person of positive consideration, and as a result forecloses backlash
claims to inequality.293 All applicants are entitled to consideration
of constitutive features of their personal identities on the basis of
their equal dignity as individual persons.
Equal dignity is nonexclusive (it applies to all), and it is
nonrivalrous (one person’s best-light consideration does not deprive
other persons of their best-light consideration).294 Because of these
their racial identities in their applications. As the Court has seen and heard,
race can profoundly influence applicants’ sense of self and outward perspective.
Removing considerations of race and ethnicity from Harvard’s admissions
process entirely would deprive applicants, including Asian American applicants,
of their right to advocate the value of their unique background, heritage, and
perspective and would likely also deprive Harvard of exceptional students who
would be less likely to be admitted without a comprehensive understanding of
their background.
Id. (citations omitted).
293. On the importance of making race a less salient category through greater consideration of the individual person, see Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 74 (2003); Siegel, supra note 157, at 787;
Siegel, supra note 4, at 1354-59.
294. In this way, affirmative consideration in light of equal dignity meets the definition of
a public good. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 387, 387 (1954) (defining a public good as one that “all enjoy in common in the sense
that each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions from any other
individual’s consumption of that good”); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS 159 (1993) (“Some goods can be secured only through a form of democratic
provision that is nonexclusive, principle- and need-regarding, and regulated primarily through
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features, equal dignity undercuts white majority claims to procedural unfairness to which the Court has been particularly
attuned.295 No person gives up anything while applicants whose
racial identity matters within social structures are assured the
possibility of their being seen in their best light.
Due process is a way to avoid alienating individual persons on the
basis of their group status. Government is not allowed to denigrate
persons, choosing for them the components of what can form an
acceptable and recognized personal identity.296 Thus, if the Court is
concerned with the perceived unfairness of affirmative benefit programs to third-party whites, then by the same reasoning it should
also be concerned with the actual unfairness of “blindness” to the
whole person that ignoring race can impose. An enforced rule of
colorblindness in a non-color-blind world would be unfair to those
for whom their race has been a socially significant factor to their
personal identities and histories.297 In other words, even if there are
costs on either side from an equality perspective, from a due process
perspective, these costs can be minimized, for all are treated equally
to respect and dignity of their personal identities—where persons
are understood in their multifaceted, complex whole, including
their race. And no person is subject to State domination by prescribing the acceptable limits to presenting their personal identities within holistic admissions programs.298
If institutions that choose affirmative action programs are denied
the ability to consider race on the basis of a judicial doctrine of colorblind equal protection, they may at the same time violate the
dignitary protections to liberty that due process affords. Blindness
voice. To attempt to provide these goods through market mechanisms is to undermine our
capacity to value and realize ourselves as fraternal democratic citizens.”).
295. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 166, at 45 (“[T]he Court has devised a new body of strict
scrutiny law designed to constrain the means by which government promotes diversity or
pursues remedial ends that is focused on protecting expectations of fair dealing.”). For an
example of how the issue of fairness manifests in public debate, see Jenni Fink, 0 Percent of
Republican College Students Think Affirmative Action is ‘Very Fair,’ but 7 Percent Say Legacy
Admissions Are, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 21, 2019, 9:29 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/affirmativeaction-legacy-admissions-very-unfair-college-poll-1466652 [https://perma.cc/B23H-7KPJ].
296. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Crocker,
supra note 212, at 21.
297. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 240-41 (rev. ed. 2012).
298. See id. at 246.
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would entrench background social inequities as constitutional
practice.299 But entrenching inequality under supposed neutral
blindness within a decision-making process designed to consider
persons neither advances the interests of individual persons nor
achieves any discernable constitutional end.300
What constitutional purpose could be served by requiring
universities or other institutions to ignore both facts and personal
identities in order to sustain a fiction of blind fairness? It does not
produce equality, and it violates equal dignity.301 Constitutional
principles aim for consistency across doctrinal domains, particularly
as applied to the same state action.302 Thus, one of these doctrines—equal protection and equal dignity as applied to affirmative
action—must be made to conform to the other. In this way, the
status quo reflected in Grutter and Fisher maintains greater consistency across the Court’s equal protection and equal dignity
jurisprudence. Only by bringing affirmative action to an end by
claiming that all affirmative consideration of race violates the
Constitution would the paradox emerge.
It is worth clarifying how the argument has unfolded so far.
Lawrence and its progeny provide a model for how to think about
the due process component of equality at stake here.303 Due process
attends to persons, not merely the procedural process due to individuals.304 It is about the identity, status, and dignity of persons.305
In addition, due process allows state actors to examine the structural effects of status denial that procedural blindness does not.306
Even if equality were understood by a future Court to require
blindness, due process requires seeing how laws create meaning
that affects the status of individual persons both in society and in
relation to government.307 Due process seeks to avoid perpetuating
299. There are plenty of such inequalities without adding to them. See, e.g., id. at 240-43.
300. See id. at 249.
301. See Eidelson, supra note 30, at 1607.
302. See, e.g., Intratextualism, supra note 280, at 748, 792-94; see also Ackerman, supra
note 89, at 1751 (“The challenge is to understand the constitutional achievements of all of the
generations since 1776, including Americans who lived in the twentieth century.”).
303. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
304. See id. at 567.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 565.
307. See id. at 575.
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dominating social structures by arbitrarily redefining a person’s
identity through enforced blindness.308 Moreover, the combined
effect of equal protection and due process under Obergefell can
highlight a convergence upon a personal right to be seen in the best
light when the state decides to confer benefits.309
A “best light” right precludes a state from replicating negative
stereotypes or locking in place social disadvantages through statusreinforcing decision processes.310 Such affirmative consideration
allows the state to see how its laws and decision-making processes
either perpetuate or break down social structures that sustain the
subordinating effects of past de jure discrimination.311 In this way,
due process supports affirmative consideration of race in ways that
differ from the current goals of affirmative action.
Affirmative consideration focuses on the individual person,
whereas affirmative action is focused on institutions and groups.312
By licensing state practices that see applicants in their best light,
the Court avoids a doctrinal paradox that would require focusing on
individual persons but forbid considering individual identity in the
full social and political context in which a person lives.313 And unlike
contexts such as suspect identification, equal dignity focuses on
ways state actors view persons in their best light.314
Whether equal dignity might require a state to adopt an affirmative action program is a bigger question.315 Enforced blindness
would violate equal dignity by foreclosing an institution’s ability to
accurately recognize the effects of social structure on its own decision-making.316 But it would require further argument to establish
an affirmative duty upon states to adopt processes for implementing

308. See id. at 578-79.
309. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593-94 (2015).
310. See id. at 2600-02.
311. See id. at 2598-2602.
312. See Kyneshawau Hurd & Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity Entitlement: Does DiversityBenefits Ideology Undermine Inclusion?, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1607 (2018).
313. See Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1753, 1765-66 (2001).
314. See id. at 1757.
315. See Strauss, supra note 290, at 127-32. See generally Harris, supra note 313, at 177274.
316. See Harris, supra note 313, at 1767.
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a best-light principle.317 The argument here is thus focused on how
a principle of equal dignity forecloses prioritizing a principle of
colorblindness and a focus on abstract individuals in such a way as
to forbid altogether an institution’s consideration of race as one
factor in its decision-making process. Equal dignity should define
the future of antidiscrimination law beyond Grutter. But such a
prospect also implicates a reconsideration of the goals of affirmative
action.
If equal dignity means that the Constitution cannot forbid states
from considering a person’s race in a best light, then the goal of
diversity changes as well. The doctrinal focus would no longer be on
the institutional decision-making prerogative to create a diverse
class.318 Rather, the focus of equal dignity shifts the compelling end
to an interest in vindicating the unique integrity of personal identity.319 By focusing on the recognition of substantive persons by state
actors, the combined effect of due process and equality reinforces a
principle that government cannot impose a subordinate status on
some individuals through a negative or blind assessment of their
identity.320
One important and surprising consequence of this constitutional
reorientation of priorities under equal dignity is that the goal of
diversity cannot be independently sustained by equal dignity.321
Diversity may be a secondary effect of a program of affirmative
consideration, but it cannot be its goal.322
C. How Does Affirmative Consideration Change Affirmative
Action?—Supply-Side and Demand-Side Reasoning
If Grutter were to sunset on (or ahead of) schedule, then universities would be forbidden from relying on diversity as a compelling
interest that justifies consideration of race. But under the tandem
317. See Strauss, supra note 290, at 106-07.
318. See Harris, supra note 313, at 1768 (discussing the diverse class focus); Bell, supra
note 18, at 1623.
319. See Tribe, supra note 38, at 22.
320. See Yoshino, supra note 22, at 748-50; Tribe, supra note 38, at 22.
321. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 22, at 775.
322. See R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending ClassBased College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029, 1033 (2001).
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application of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, an
alternative approach is available.323 The new goal would be to
consider individuals as persons, affording them affirmative consideration for their unique personal identities, histories, and
accomplishments. But in order to consider individuals holistically
as persons when individuals are members of socially significant
groups, then a decision maker has to be able to consider their race
when race is salient to personal identity.324 To do otherwise would
be to deny them an essential feature of their personhood.325 Thus, to
sunset Grutter’s diversity rationale would not preclude raceconscious admissions programs justified according to equal dignity
principles aimed at providing affirmative consideration to individual
persons.326
The goal of affirmative consideration practices, however, would
be to see persons in their best light, not to achieve institutional
diversity. Nonetheless, through a version of the doctrine of double
effect, universities could achieve diversity without making it the
overriding goal.327 By affirmatively considering individual applicants
on the basis of their personal identities, which include race, institutions could still recruit diverse student bodies through seeking to
ensure equal dignity in the treatment of all applications.328 By
focusing on the distinctive merits of individual applicants and their
personal identities—which unavoidably include race—achieving
diversity becomes a secondary effect of the primary goal of affording
equal dignity to individual persons through consideration of their
applications as whole persons.329
323. See Tribe, supra note 38, at 22.
324. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 22, at 795-96.
325. By focusing more precisely on the meaning of persons and personal identity,
consideration of race in a holistic conception of the person is consistent with Justice Thomas’s
claim that the Constitution embeds a “principle that the government must treat citizens as
individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.” Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
326. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
327. See G.E.M. Anscombe, War and Murder, in MORAL PROBLEMS: A COLLECTION OF
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 289, 293-95 (James Rachels ed., 2d ed. 1975) (introducing idea of
“double effect” in moral reasoning).
328. See Jonathan P. Feingold, Hidden in Plain Sight: A More Compelling Case for
Diversity, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 59, 111 (2019).
329. Such an approach also affords greater equal opportunity with diversity as a possible
outcome, but not as the overriding goal. See, e.g., id. at 79-80, 109-10 (arguing for an equal
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Under an equality approach, the constitutional issue concerns
institutional goals like diversity, which as the Court warns, keeps
racial identity at the forefront of decision-making.330 Their goal is to
achieve an outcome that is “made,” not “grown,” organically.331 The
university’s interest is supply-side.332 They have a good to distribute—university admission—with the goal of obtaining a diverse
student body.333 To achieve diversity, the university must remain
race conscious, measuring their admissions for whether metrics
such as Michigan’s “critical mass” have been met.334
By contrast, under a due process equal dignity approach, the
constitutional issue concerns individual interests. Applicants seek
admission through affirmative consideration of the features of their
applications that put them in their best light.335 Their interest is
demand-side.336 Such individual affirmative consideration may
coincide with institutional goals of diversity, but for different
reasons. Individual applicants do not seek to “promote diversity”
through seeking consideration of how their racial background
matters to them and their admissions application.337 Rather, individual applicants seek to present their qualifications and personal
experiences with the hope that the institution sees them in the best
light possible.338 Individual applicants simply seek admission and
in doing so benefit from an institution’s affirmative consideration of
their application as a whole.339
Diversity is a supply-side rationale, focused on the institutional
needs of universities.340 Diversity only incidentally aligns with the
opportunity conception of diversity).
330. See id. at 114.
331. See F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 37 (1998).
332. See id. at 76.
333. But see Hurd & Plaut, supra note 312, at 1622-23, 1628 (arguing that diversity
benefits disproportionately consider the benefits to whites).
334. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318-20 (2003).
335. See Eidelson, supra note 30, at 1607.
336. See HAYEK, supra note 331, at 76.
337. See Ford, supra note 18, at 1809.
338. See Eidelson, supra note 30, at 1607.
339. See Hurd & Plaut, supra note 312, at 1607.
340. The effects may be demonstrably positive, though the objective remains institutionally
focused. See, e.g., Adam Chilton, Justin Driver, Jonathan S. Masur & Kyle Rozema, Assessing
Affirmative Action’s Diversity Rationale, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 358 (2022).
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broader need to provide affirmative consideration of individual
applicants by virtue of their race because those individuals may
have suffered from the direct or lingering effects of racially discriminatory political and social structures.341 Taken in its own terms,
diversity is about the composition of a student body for the institution’s own ends, which may have the secondary effect of aligning
with the interests of persons of color upon whose applications the
institution takes affirmative action.342 But diversity is an institutional education goal, or, even viewed more skeptically as Justice
Thomas dismissively argues in his Grutter dissent, a goal about
“[c]lassroom aesthetics,” not an end that seeks to overcome lingering
effects of racial subordination.343 To end supply-side diversity as a
race-plus institutional admissions procedure would not end demandside diversity as a call for affirmative consideration of the equal
dignity of each applicant.
Equal dignity in considering applicants is a demand-side rationale, focused on the claims persons make about their identities.344
Individuals seek admission by presenting their socially embedded
personal histories and accomplishments in their best light.345
Persons who are members of disadvantaged groups have a particular interest in ensuring their applications are treated with equal
dignity.346 By focusing on individual persons, an educational
institution may achieve diversity indirectly as the secondary effect
of pursuing the equal dignity of applicants.347 In this way, the
diversity goals of affirmative action can no longer provide the
rationale for race-conscious decision procedures. Diversity no longer
would need to be a compelling state interest under an equal

341. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Essay, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 931 (2001) (“I am concerned that
liberal supporters of affirmative action have used the diversity argument to defend
affirmative action at elite universities and law schools without questioning the ways that
traditional admissions criteria continue to perpetuate race and class privilege.”).
342. See Hurd & Plaut, supra note 312, at 1611-13, 1622.
343. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also
Lawrence, supra note 341, at 958; Bell, supra note 18, at 1625.
344. See Tribe, supra note 38, at 17, 20-22.
345. See Eidelson, supra note 30, at 1623-24.
346. See id. at 1625.
347. See Banks, supra note 322, at 1033.
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protection rationale.348 Instead, the goal of equal dignity would
provide the rationale for race-conscious admissions programs.
Ironically, under an equal dignity doctrine, the future sunset of
Grutter would not be the end to race-conscious admissions
processes—as the Grutter dissents foretell349—because the Constitution would continue to allow universities to consider race as a means
to protect the equal dignity of all persons who seek admission.
Affirmative action as an institutional supply-side goal focused on
diversity would be displaced by affirmative consideration as an
individual demand-side end focused on individual persons. To
achieve the latter, educational institutions would still be the
principal actors, just as they would under a colorblindness principle.350 But the goal would no longer depend upon the institutional
commitment to diversity but upon the integrity of holistic affirmative consideration processes that would have the secondary effect of
promoting diversity.
A number of practical advantages would flow from this doctrinal
reorientation. This shift would satisfy the skeptical worry that the
more institutions entrench conceptions of race, the more they
reproduce them as socially salient categories.351 By shifting the constitutional focus away from diversity, a future Court can guide
institutional actors towards holistic assessment that does not necessarily foreground and entrench race as a distinctively salient
category. In addition, institutional entrenchment of racial categories
does more than keep race relevant, as the Court has warned, but
also means that members of a group lose some of their own authority over self-definition.352 Instead, the authority granted by equal
dignity would allow individual persons more control over their self348. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 18, at 1809.
349. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 393 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
350. See Chilton et al., supra note 340, at 347.
351. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 313, at 1765-66. Scholars have analyzed this dynamic of
raising the salience of a group classification in other settings. See, e.g., Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1457-58, 1461, 1470 (2002); see also FRASER, supra note 86, at 26.
352. See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE 90-104 (2005); Yoshino, supra note
22, at 795-96. There is a persistent problem as well in the way that courts recognize or fail to
recognize race in judicial opinions. See Justin Driver, Essay, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 404, 457 (2012) (“The contemporary racial climate demands that courts approach
racial matters with nuance and reflection and—perhaps, above all—explanation.”).
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definitions about which institutions could then adapt practices of
affirmative consideration.
Barriers to educational access do not depend upon race alone. As
others have argued, income inequality is a principal driver of
structural barriers to a genuine meritorious access to competitive
educational institutions.353 Because a supply-side focus on diversity
makes recognition of racial categories easier than socioeconomic
status, institutions have struggled to find ways to avoid entrenching
social structures of economic exclusion. In some ways, focus on race
leaves institutions blind to class.354 Shifting the end of affirmative
action away from the supply-side focus on diversity to the demandside interest in affirmative consideration of individual experiences
would promote constitutional principles of equal dignity while
avoiding real or apparent inequality regarding both economic status
and race.
Moreover, because all applicants are similarly situated, the
backlash charge of racial unfairness first articulated by Justice
Powell in Bakke, and reinforced through dissents by Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, would not apply.355 Indeed, by
shifting attention to affirmative consideration, the appearance of
procedural fairness can be matched with race-conscious decision
processes. Where colorblindness is blind to more than race, an equal
dignity principle attends to both social meanings and social structures in which a number of factors, including race, may be present.
All applicants will be seen in their best light, and none will get an
automatic advantage over another. No doubt, an applicant who has
benefitted from a social structure that has imposed harms on third
353. See, e.g., Catharine B. Hill, American Higher Education and Income Inequality, in 11
EDUCATION FINANCE & POLICY 325, 326 (2016); Caroline Hoxby & Christopher Avery, The
Missing “One-Offs”: The Hidden Supply of High-Achieving, Low-Income Students, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1, 2 (2013); Banks, supra note 322, at 1052-53.
354. See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, White Privilege and White Disadvantage, 105 VA. L. REV.
449, 450 (2019) (“[I]f white privilege is not enjoyed by poor white people, then it may make
little sense to call it white privilege—inasmuch as white privilege implies that the privilege
flows from being a member of the white race.”).
355. 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (“All state-imposed classifications that rearrange
burdens and benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the
individuals burdened.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“Preferment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the most divisive of
all policies.”).
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parties will not receive further benefits from institutions being blind
to those third-party harms when considering the personal histories
of those who have suffered them. But the inability to benefit from
social structures that unfairly distribute public goods is not a
propitious basis on which to make a constitutional claim of inequality. There is no constitutional right to entrench social advantage
through mandatory state blindness.356
If a process of affirmative consideration were applied to a raceconscious program like the one used by the University of Texas at
issue in Fisher I and Fisher II, the university would be allowed to
examine the intake from a race-neutral process to see how it might
ensure that the remaining applications were reviewed in their best
light.357 This process would allow consideration of race, but might
also require considering other forms of social structure—such as
economic status—as a way of affording affirmative consideration to
each individual person as a whole.358 In this regard, an institution
that focused on race alone to the potential exclusion of other sources
of social structure might run afoul of the equal dignity principle by
failing to consider the personal identities of those whose lives are
entwined in these structures. Although race remains highly
relevant, any social structure that is meaningful to a person’s
identity—such as those related to sexual orientation or sex
identity—should also be relevant to affirmative consideration of
persons under equal dignity principles. This consequence can
dampen any perceived conflict between race and class (or any other
social category), opening up new avenues for individuals to present
their personal histories in their best light with an expectation that
institutions will give them affirmative consideration.359 By establishing a process that will be perceived as fair to all applicants, this
approach would promote what Professor Siegel identifies as “social
356. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (rejecting argument that
Maryland’s method of calculating welfare benefits denied equal protection of the law to those
who received less or no benefit).
357. Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 304 (2013); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206-07 (2016).
358. But see Khiara M. Bridges, The Deserving Poor, the Undeserving Poor, and ClassBased Affirmative Action, 66 EMORY L.J. 1049, 1052-53 (2017) (arguing that class-based
affirmative action would only benefit white people who are societally viewed as “deserving
poor”).
359. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (discussing the importance of
protecting rights that are “inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”).
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cohesion.”360 Rather than subdividing Americans along classifications reified in law and implemented by educational institutions, a
best-light approach is available to all and need not involve entrenching institutionally defined categories as social reality.
Moreover, affirmative consideration need not foreclose the future
sunset of Grutter, even though it is fully consistent with its reaffirmation. But, unlike a diversity-based affirmative action rationale,
an equal dignity approach is not beholden to the Court’s position
that race consciousness has a decaying lifespan under a color-blind
Equal Protection Clause in which diversity might fail to remain
compelling.361 In this way, the compelling interest in diversity can
sunset, but race-consciousness will continue under an equal dignity
rationale. And under the fairness concerns of equal dignity, universities will be permitted not only to focus upon race but encouraged
to accord affirmative consideration to the social status of other
applicants who might similarly suffer structural disadvantage in
ways that contribute to their own personal identities. Even if the
Court were to sunset Grutter as promised, the core of affirmative
action will persist.
Although both diversity and equal dignity can ground raceconscious admissions programs, differences of principle—even if
overlapping—can produce different effects. For example, through an
equal dignity approach, consideration of race in university admissions returns to its pre-Bakke roots. Before Bakke, the central
justification for race consciousness was that it provided a remedial
means to address the continuing effects of past de jure racial
discrimination.362 After Bakke, the justification shifted to claims
about providing a diverse student body for institutional purposes
under a holistic approach.363 This latter justification took root in the
life of American educational institutions and became disconnected
360. See Siegel, supra note 166, at 42 (“[G]overnment classification by race poses risks to
social cohesion, threatening balkanization and racial conflict.”); Siegel, supra note 4, at 12981300.
361. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from now,
the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary.”).
362. See Fiss, supra note 51, at 144; Brian Leiter, Academic Ethics: Is ‘Diversity’ the Best
Reason for Affirmative Action?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.chronicle.
com/article/academic-ethics-is-diversity-the-best-reason-for-affirmative-action/ [https://perma.
cc/WFV9-8UH8]; Lawrence, supra note 341, at 931.
363. See Lawrence, supra note 341, at 928, 931.
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from the remedial grounding from which it first sprang.364 Diversity
became an end unto itself.365
With an equal dignity approach, affirmative consideration of all
applicants invites institutions to consider the effects of social
structures that might perpetuate forms of subordination. By considering personal attributes as a whole—including an individual’s
race—universities can recognize the effects of social structures in
the personal lives of applicants. And though not programmatically
remedial, by affirmatively considering structural effects, decision
makers can confer remedial benefits as secondary effects. Moreover,
diversity need no longer be a yardstick by which individual persons
get measured for the role they might play in achieving it for
institutional ends. Rather, equal dignity in considering substantive
persons becomes an end in itself whereby institutions can also
achieve secondary goals like student diversity and remedial
benefits. The goal of affirmative consideration is unlikely to have a
group-based external measure such as diversity or critical mass.
Rather, affirmative consideration is focused on the individual
person, thereby satisfying one of the background principles to which
the Court is committed.366
From the educational institution’s perspective, especially as the
Grutter dissenters understand affirmative action, holistic applicant
assessment aimed at diversity was never about holism, but about
the particularism of considering race.367 A person’s race is the controversial particular that really mattered to affirmative action
programs such as Michigan’s, even within a purported holistic
assessment.368 Under an equal dignity approach, institutions would
no longer be able to pursue this kind of race particularism as a
means to an institutional end. Rather, an institution would need to
consider any number of additional factors that serve as indicia for
forms of social disadvantage presented as relevant by the applicant.
No longer “race plus,” but rather whole person complete. The
outcomes in terms of achieving racial diversity may be very much
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. See Eidelson, supra note 30, at 1607 (“[I]n a society characterized by racial bias,
attending to race will often be necessary to treating a person respectfully as an individual.”).
367. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355-56 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
368. See Lawrence, supra note 341, at 934.
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the same, but the appearance and reality of the decision-making
process comports with constitutional values of fairness with regard
to individual persons—the perceived failure of which, the Court
claimed, was a basis for backlash.369 And even if the decisionmaking outcomes remain similar—and the secondary goal of diversity remains achievable—the equal dignity approach has the added
benefit of avoiding constitutional backlash, while enriching any
conception of diversity an institution may seek to achieve. Issues
such as income inequality, for example, may be relevant in a way
that the focus on racial diversity made invisible.370 In this way, the
ends shift away from entrenched conceptions of group classifications
to allow room for more dynamic understandings of how social
structures, such as income inequality, in addition to racism and
racial subordination, provide meaning and context for individual
personal identities and histories.371
In these ways, equal dignity shifts the doctrinal focus from the
institution to individual persons.372 Institutions will not define the
categories of diversity, but rather individuals will drive the terms
by which personal identity can be articulated for affirmative consideration.373 This demand-side orientation has a future potential,
allowing for a more democratic and organic expectation to be placed
on institutions to engage in self-evaluation about how they might
best provide affirmative consideration to realize the equal dignity
of all applicants.

369. See Siegel, supra note 166, at 42-43; James, supra note 18, at 501-02.
370. See, e.g., WALTER BENN MICHAELS, THE TROUBLE WITH DIVERSITY: HOW WE LEARNED
TO LOVE IDENTITY AND IGNORE INEQUALITY 86-88, 95-99 (2006); Richard D. Kahlenberg, ClassBased Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1037, 1061 (1996); Goodwin Liu, Race, Class,
Diversity, Complexity, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 289, 291-98 (2004). But see Cheryl I. Harris,
Fisher’s Foibles: From Race and Class to Class Not Race, UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE (Nov. 16,
2017), https://www.uclalawreview.org/fishers-foibles-race-class-class-not-race/ [https://perma.
cc/SP3Z-Z272].
371. See Liu, supra note 370, at 291 (discussing some of the entrenched conceptions of
group classifications).
372. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (marking the importance
of individual autonomy).
373. On the narrative aspects of personal identity, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE
200-03 (Univ. Notre Dame Press 1981); Seamus Barker, Paul Ricoeur and Narrative Identity:
Why We Are Our Story, PSYCH. TODAY (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/
blog/post-clinical/201604/paul-ricoeur-and-narrative-identity [https://perma.cc/5WLN-C6V2].
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CONCLUSION
Grutter v. Bollinger grounds the constitutional justification for
public institutional consideration of race based upon the compelling
interest in pursuing a diverse student body and faculty. By its own
terms, however, its days are numbered.374 The Court will again hear
anti-affirmative-action arguments aimed at fulfilling Grutter’s
promise to end affirmative action within twenty-five years.375 As the
argument here has unfolded, the key components of this argument—colorblindness grounded in a conception of individualism—
contain internal tensions as well as intratextual inconsistencies that
make the end of race consciousness contemplated by those seeking
to overturn Grutter far more complicated. Abstract individualism
cannot withstand scrutiny as a principle of constitutional law, and
the more textually salient conception of persons with socially
complex identities undermines strict colorblindness. As a combined
principle of equal protection and due process, equal dignity protects
the power of persons to define their identities to include a racial
component and the ability for institutions to give them affirmative
consideration for their unique identities taken as a whole.
As we have seen, there is substantial overlap between equality
and liberty in both the case law and conceptually, but there is also
an interesting difference. Equality requires examination of the
government interest in seeking to provide benefits to particular
individuals by virtue of their racial background. Equal dignity, as
a component of liberty, by contrast, requires removing constitutional
barriers to individual claims to be viewed in light of their personal
identities and histories when the state distributes scarce resources
through assessment of individual merit. Equal dignity does not
require government actors to justify why they are considering
persons as having complex identities; rather, it allows them to
afford individual persons equal respect and dignity for the persons

374. See 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary.”).
375. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harv. Coll., 980 F.3d
157, 163-64, 204 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022) (mem.) (No. 20-1199).
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they are.376 Claims about equal protection implicate decisions
regarding group membership, whereas claims about equal dignity
focus on the individual person. In this way, a properly reoriented
commitment to individuals, as a commitment to fully constituted
persons textually protected by the Constitution, is a way of realizing
an antidiscrimination jurisprudence of equality and equal dignity
on terms more consistent with text and precedent.377 The Court’s
premise that the Constitution protects the equality of individuals
leads to the unexpected outcome that in order to respect individuals,
the Court must focus on persons who have complex personal
identities. Focusing on persons means that government actors cannot be blind to socially significant components of personal identity,
such as race. Therefore, as this Article argues, overturning Grutter’s
diversity rationale for consideration of race—as the Court has the
opportunity to do—would not resolve the question of the constitutionality of considering race under equal dignity principles.
Confronting the same general question about the constitutionality
of considering race in university admissions, equal protection,
standing alone, and an equal dignity approach lead to different
inquiries. However, equal dignity has the added benefit of providing
a means of reconciling competing constitutional values. Equal
dignity provides a way for states to pursue affirmative consideration
of applicants in ways that promote both their individuality and their
complex identities and histories, which necessarily include their
group memberships. Under equal dignity, individual applicants may
urge affirmative consideration of their race—and other features—as
constitutive aspects of their personal identity, asserting constitutional harm from doctrines that would mandate institutional
blindness to them. Equal dignity provides a doctrinal basis for
realizing a more nuanced form of the Court’s bedrock premise that
the Constitution protects individuals, not groups. Thus, taking individual persons seriously—as the Court urges—has the unexpected
implication that government institutions cannot be foreclosed from
taking a person’s racial identity seriously as well. The Court’s commitment to individual persons as the bearers of constitutional rights
376. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (“They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.
The Constitution grants them that right.”).
377. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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entails a constitutional commitment to persons who can be seen
holistically in ways that do not deny their racial identity. Equal
dignity therefore also forecloses commitment to color-blind constitutionalism if that means denying the reality of an individual’s
personal identity by imposing race-blind processes on university
admissions. Thus, even if the Court were to seize the opportunity to
sunset Grutter as scheduled, the reorientation of race consciousness
in official decisions opens up the possibility of a new way to provide
affirmative consideration of a person’s racial identity under equal
dignity.378

378. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., 980 F.3d at 163-64, 204.

